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JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
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A Hand-to-Hand Approach to Development and Security in Sub-Saharan Africa

by

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United States Army



A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the nexus between security and development in sub-Saharan Africa. The thesis concludes that a joint strategy for security and development, rather than separate approaches within the Departments of State and Defense, will enhance the United States' ability to achieve its interests in sub-Saharan Africa. This is important because Africa holds promise to become a continent that competes well in the Global market. In contrast, some parts of Africa, if left under-developed, may give rise to continued violence, corruption and harbor terrorist organizations.

The nexus between security and development is an extremely important one. The Departments of State and Defense, United States Agency for International Development and U.S. AFRICOM each are key players in promoting stability and security in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).

The thesis begins with a review of the history and environment, and then examines challenges facing the U.S. Government, reviews U.S. Africa policy and Departments of State and Defense strategic objectives. Lastly, this thesis proposes considerations to develop a joint security and development strategy and provides a conclusion that summarizes the key points of the thesis.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACOTA	African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
AFRICOM	Africa Command
AU	African Union
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CENTCOM	Central Command
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West Africa
EUCOM	European Command
FSI	Failed State Index
IMET	International Military Education and Training
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
PACOM	Pacific Command
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines how the U.S. Departments of State and Defense execute security and development in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The purpose of the thesis is to demonstrate that a joint strategy rather than separate execution of security and development activities by Department of State (DOS) and Department of Defense(DOD) respectively will further promote U.S. foreign interests, build security apparatus capabilities, decrease the number of failed states, and enhance effective governance in the region.

Execution of security and development as separate rather than joint approaches in the SSA resulted in slow and in some cases, halted growth in some of the poorest and under-developed countries in the world. Sub-Saharan Africa faces a range of security and development issues that require a long-term capacity-building approach and functional partnerships.

U.S. officials stressed a strong commitment to assisting Africa throughout the last decade. In a June 26, 2003 speech, former President Bush described a “partnership” with Africa that included support for security and development.¹ During a visit to Ghana in July 2009, President Obama expressed a similar sentiment in stating, “Africa is at a

¹Ted Dagne, “Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues”, *Congressional Research Services Report for Congress*, (July 28, 2006): 2.

moment of promise.”² Shortly thereafter in August 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited the region to endorse the administrations commitment.³

The nexus between development and security is an extremely important one. The framework of the ‘security–development nexus’ has been considered as a way of creating a ‘holistic’ approach that encompasses the efforts of DOS, DOD and others. While it would be wrong to argue that security and development were entirely separate policy areas prior to the end of the Cold War, their linkage was much more due to informal collaboration rather than resulting from deliberate policy or directives.⁴ In the years since, U.S. policy for Africa has expanded and warrants review.

It is important to understand the definitions of the terms security and development in the context of U.S. foreign assistance. *Security* is the protection of the territorial integrity, stability, and vital interests using political, legal, or coercive instruments of power.⁵ In recent years, the definition broadened to include activities against non-military threats that lead to violent conflict and affect overall security. *Development* typically refers to the processes and strategies through which states seek to achieve more prosperous and equitable standards of living.⁶ Since the end of the Cold War, security

² White House, Office of the press Secretary, “Remarks by the President to the Ghanaian Parliament”,(remarks, Accra, Ghana, July 11, 2009)

³Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, (speech to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Monrovia, Liberia, August 11, 2009)

⁴ Lars Buur, Steffen Jensen and Finn Stepputat, *The Security-Development Nexus* (Cape Town, HSRC Press, 2007), 9.

⁵ International Peace Academy. “The Security-Development Nexus: Conflict, Peace and Development in the 21st Century.” *IPA Report*. (May 2004):3
[http://reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sia/SKAI-7DRMQB/\\$file/IPA_security-development_nexus_May_04-pdf](http://reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sia/SKAI-7DRMQB/$file/IPA_security-development_nexus_May_04-pdf). (accessed August 10, 2009)

⁶ Ibid. ,3

and development concerns have been increasingly interlinked.⁷ Violent conflicts during this period ravaged many societies, leading to death and destruction, crumbling of weak states, regional insecurity, and a cycle of underdevelopment, instability, and aggression.⁸ Governments and other institutions have stated that they have become increasingly aware of the need to integrate security and development programs in their relations with the growing number of failed and potentially failing states.⁹ Nine of the world's ten poorest countries are in SSA. Diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria continue to ravage the region and inhibit growth. The challenges of extreme poverty, poor management of natural resources, human rights abuses, and shortages of food, clean water and fuel continue to plague the region. Millions live on less than a dollar a day, average life expectancy is forty-eight years and falling, more than a third of all children are malnourished, and conflict and corruption adversely affect people's lives.¹⁰

Weak and failing states will remain a condition in SSA for the next 20-25 years largely due to inadequate security, poor development and increased transnational threats.¹¹ Development programs are very difficult in a country that is

⁷ David Chandler. "Security-development nexus and the rise of anti-foreign policy." *Journal of International Relations and Development*, Volume 10, Number 4, (2007),1. <http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jird>. (accessed September 10, 2009)

⁸ Flavius Stan. "The Security-Development Nexus: Conflict, Peace and Development in the 21st Century, International Peace Academy Report". (May 2004), 1-5. [http://releifweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/bd900sid/SKAI-RMQB/\\$file/IPA_security_development_nexus_May04.pdf](http://releifweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/bd900sid/SKAI-RMQB/$file/IPA_security_development_nexus_May04.pdf). (accessed October 3, 2009)

⁹ Robert I. Rotberg. "Failed State, Weak States, Collapsed States: Causes and Indicators". *World Peace Foundation*, (May 2, 2003). 1-10

¹⁰ Susan Willet. "Development and Security in Africa: a challenge for the new millennium". 1. http://www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file-links/acheivingwillet.pdf (accessed August 25, 2009)

¹¹ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operating Environment 2008* (Suffolk, VA: United States Government): 35

under developed, and exhibits those characteristics associated with a failed or a failing state. From a development perspective, risk of instability is often associated with a host of diverse factors including crime, unemployment, population dislocations, ethnic rivalries and human rights violations. From a security perspective, insurgencies, mass killings, ethnic and religious conflicts, and terrorism are often reflections of societal problems and have a strong correlation with a state's inability to address these problems.¹²

In recent years, analysts and U.S. policymakers have noted Africa's' growing strategic importance to U.S. interests. Among those interests are the increasing importance of Africa's natural resources, particularly energy resources, and growing concern over violent extremist activities, piracy, and illicit drug trafficking. Violent conflicts are among the greatest threats to security and development in Africa. Internal wars, tribal feuds, and coups have inflicted massive destruction upon the continent's infrastructure, displaced millions of people, disrupted livelihoods, and seriously damaged much of the environment. The effects of violence alone keep many sub-Saharan African states in a perpetual state of weakness. Several African governments, and the international community are grappling with ways to end violent conflicts when they arise and to address their root causes. However, comprehensive knowledge, policy, and practice for effective responses remain disjointed and intervention by external actors appears to have limited effects. It is here where the U.S. Departments of State and Defense can most influence progress and enhance security and stability.

¹² Stan. *The Security-Development Nexus: Conflict, Peace and Development in the 21st Century*, 2

This thesis has six chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 provides a brief history and examines the environment. The chapter includes discussion on colonialism and the Cold War, the first of which had profound and long-lasting effects linked to many of the challenges in SSA today. This chapter concludes that many of the conditions in SSA are linked to the history and environment. Next, Chapter 3 examines select causes of conflict and examines failed and weak states to establish a baseline for policy and strategic objective review and refinement. Chapter 3 also examines the countries of Liberia and Ghana, as case studies, to highlight paths to state failure and success respectively. This chapter builds upon the information provided earlier and references the most serious issues that challenge U.S. policy and growth in the region. The case studies address Liberia and Ghana because each are postured to catapult the region of West Africa as a hub of effective governance and prosperity. Next, Chapter 4 examines U.S. policies, National Security and Defense strategies and the objectives of the Departments of Defense and State including those of the United States Agency for International Development. In addition, other stakeholders such as the African Union (AU) are considered. The analysis concludes that although U.S. policy and related strategic objectives are effective, there is room for improvement both in focus and in implementation. Finally, Chapter 5 looks at select components inherent to developing a joint strategy for security and development referencing previously addressed information. This chapter establishes a starting point for a joint strategy. Finally, chapter 6 provides a conclusion, which briefly revisits restates the major points of the thesis to provide provides key considerations for a joint strategy and recommends steps to move forward.

CHAPTER 2

AFRICA AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Introduction

The environment and history of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is as complex, rich and diverse as it is unique. The region possesses a great wealth of natural resources, which attract attention from outside countries including the United States. It is important to understand both the environment and history to provide context to U.S. foreign policy in SSA and the importance of security and development across the region.¹

Environment

To understand the environment of SSA, one must appreciate its vast geography. Sub-Saharan Africa is a geographical term used to describe the area of the continent that lies below the Sahara desert. It is made of six sub regions: The Sahel, West and East Africa, Central Africa, South Africa and the Great Lakes Region.² The region consists of 48 countries (see Appendix A) and contrasts with the largely Islamic northern Africa.³ The Sahel, which in Arabic means *the shore*, is the transitional zone between the Sahara and the tropical savanna near the Sudan region and the forested region further south. Many different factors divide SSA including nationality, ethnicity, language, economy, and religion. The environment may be the most complex on earth with a diverse population comprised of 3,000 indigenous ethnic groups speaking over 1,000 different local

¹ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operating Environment 2010*. 54

² Patrick M. Cronin, *America's Security Role in a Changing World*. (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2009), 306.

³ U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of Natural Resources Management, World Maps. www.nric.net/images/afr.jpg. (accessed November 10, 2009)

languages.⁴ The Horn of Africa and large areas of Sudan are geographically part of SSA, but show strong Middle Eastern influence and, with the exception of Ethiopia, are also part of the Arab world.⁵ This distinction may contribute to the disparity in development, security, and levels of conflict across the vast region as well as the heavy influence of Muslim culture in Somalia, Sudan, and near-by countries. Moreover, this northern area has attracted special attention from Department of Defense (DOD) for it has been used as an infiltration zone south into sub-Saharan region and north into Northern Africa from Algeria's Al Qaeda Islamic Movement (AIM) and other radical elements.⁶

Vast natural resources including rivers, swamps, rainforest, and deserts have all shaped the geological past and development of SSA and even today, continue to attract tourism and foreign investment. In contrast, these same natural resources pitted tribe against tribe and village against village over the past several years. For example, in early 2009, tribal clashes in Kenya occurred over heavy deforestation in formally protected areas of the country directly infringing on the amount of land available for non-urban tribes to live and farm, causing friction and making U.S. assistance programs challenging.⁷

⁴ Richard G. Catoire, "A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command Plan," *Parameters*, (Winter 2000-01): 105.

⁵ Robert O. Collins and James M. Burns, "A History of Sub-Saharan Africa." (United Kingdom, University Press of Cambridge, 2007), 7.

⁶ Princeton Lyman, "Strengthening U.S. Diplomacy to Anticipate, Prevent And Respond to Conflict in Africa." (April 21, 2009), 6. (Accessed October 10, 2009).

⁷ Lynette Obare and J. B. Wangwe, *Underlying Causes of Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Kenya*, 1-2. <http://www.wrm.org.uy/deforestation/Africa/Kenya.html>. (accessed December 10, 2009).

Colonialism

In 1885, several years after the slave trade from Africa ended, several European powers met in Berlin to establish frontiers in Africa. This meeting, known as the Berlin Conference, divided many traditional borders to meet European needs, not those of the African states.⁸ An outcome of the Berlin Conference divided ethnic groups, split tribes and divided traditional tribal borders that existed for decades and longer. In many cases, unrealistic geographical borders either united or divided ethnic groups based on economic, political or strategic necessity with little concern for common culture or social ties.⁹

Lasting for about seventy years, colonialism profoundly shaped the structure and character of SSA and exasperated nearly every conflict in which the U.S. has been involved in the region. Colonialism had an overwhelming influence on the identity, stability, and economic development in SSA. A function of colonialism was the export of Western values, exploitation of resources, and interruption of the traditional life styles of many Africans.¹⁰ This was a very tumultuous period for all of SSA and some countries fared better than others did. The effects are still visible today. Often European colonial powers selected one tribe to serve the colonial bureaucracy creating an awkward form of loyalty and tribal dependence, while others simply marginalized the population. As colonialism quickly took root, many countries lost their base of power, independence and sense of purpose. As independence came in the 1950-60s, more powerful ethnic

⁸ Peter Schwab, *A Continent Self Destructs* (New York: Palgrave Press, 2001), 17

⁹ Ibid., 17

¹⁰ Ibid., 150

groups commonly gained control over the state while others did not prosper as well. For several countries, the transition to independence came almost overnight followed by a rapid departure of the former colonial rulers. This created a dire situation for many countries that did not have established sustainable systems to enable their transition from colonial rule to independence.

During much of the colonial period, the majority of the African people simply provided manual labor that stimulated little scientific initiative. The result was slow technological growth.¹¹ Instead of speeding growth, activities such as mining and cash-crop farming sped up the decay of traditional African life adversely affecting several vital aspects of the culture. Agriculture and farming suffered contributing to a slow, but steady decay in the environment and eroded natural habitats at an unprecedented scale. Africa's position became more disadvantageous in the political, economic, and military spheres. This caused many countries to lose power and have little to leverage in the global environment.¹² It also created a desperate condition for many just to survive and fueled internal conflict, black marketing, and other grave conditions. Overall, colonialism was a terribly destructive force. It fractured traditional societies and left little upon which to build. The result was the creation of a whole subset of Africans that did not comfortably fit anywhere.¹³

¹¹ Ibid., 232

¹² Walter Rodney, *How Europe Undeveloped Africa* (Washington D.C.: Howard University Press, 1981), 224.

¹³ Schwab, *A Continent Self Destructs*, 20

Cold War and After

The end of the Cold War had a profound effect in Africa.¹⁴ From the early 1990s, aid to SSA increasingly came with conditions and was not beneficial. In addition, around this time, superpowers were eager to acquire client states. To Africa, the advantage was that aid and other subsidies were easily available in return for allegiance. The disadvantage was that many unscrupulous dictators were able to gain power and breed conflict and corruption. Charles Taylor, the former President of Liberia is a good example. He governed over Liberia for several years instilling fear and mistrust amongst the people, while his regime promoted and supported a corrupt government.

Summary

The long and sometimes complex history of sub-Saharan Africa coupled with its diverse environment forms a unique landscape that contributes to the inconsistent levels of security and development across the region. It would not be fair to separate the future of SSA from its past. It is important to understand this landscape to refine and focus U.S. foreign policy. Following the above introduction, this thesis provides a review of some of the challenges facing both SSA and the USG. The intent of the review is to provide a focal point for U.S. foreign policy and Department of State and Department of Defense strategic objectives.

¹⁴ Ibid., 21

CHAPTER 3

CHALLENGES IN AFRICA

Introduction

Many factors contribute to the challenges facing the U.S. Government (USG) in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Some of these factors have roots in colonialism and the Cold War. Others stem from pandemic diseases and transnational threats such as illicit drugs and illegal smuggling. Regardless of the source, these factors hinder security, stability and overall development in the region. Implementing U.S. foreign policy is difficult under these conditions. This chapter examines some of the challenges confronting SSA today. It is important to understand these challenges as they correlate to the strategic objectives of the Departments of State and Defense and other organizations within the United States and Africa.

Conflict

Sub-Saharan Africa is the region with the highest rates of civil conflict on the globe.¹ Conflict, defined as a state of open, often prolonged fighting, a battle or war, has always existed to varying levels across the region.² It is the leading cause of failed or failing states, dysfunctional governments, and negative growth. Conflict dramatically increased in level and scale throughout the 1990s and in this century, over half of SSA is embroiled in some form of conflict. Often caused by inequality, economic decline, and state collapse, conflict continues to be a challenge in SSA. The nature of conflict is

¹Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, *On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa* (Washington D.C.: World Bank Press, 2000), 20.

²Webster's Dictionary, 9th Ed., s.v. "Conflict."

predominantly regional and increasingly affects a growing number of non-combatants. There are many costs resulting from conflict. For example, refugees growing from uprooted populations put enormous pressure on government services. Additionally, conflict has led to the destruction of the basic social infrastructure. For example, the fifteen-year war in Mozambique destroyed over 40% of health centers and schools, causing a serious need for local and international support.³ To assist, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is helping Mozambique transition through this condition with health and economic support.⁴

Many conflicts occur where there is a tradition of resolving problems by violent means.⁵ Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda are good examples with years of internal violence that often spread across their borders and affected the political development and security of neighboring countries. Conflict often involves tribal feuds, cultural clashes and other group or clan supported activity. Sadly, these events blemish the history of SSA. One such event was the conflict and genocide in Rwanda 15 years ago. Rwanda, a landlocked nation about the size of Maryland, is one of the poorest in SSA with a population at the time of the atrocities that was largely comprised of two ethnic groups, the Tutsis

³ “The Causes of Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.” *Department for International Development*, (October 2001), 12. <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/documents/publications/prevetning-conflict-pdf>. (accessed August 29, 2009).

⁴ United States Agency for International Development, “*Sub-Saharan Africa*,” under “*America.Gov*,” http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/countries/mozambique/.pdf (accessed February 12, 2010)

⁵ “*The Causes of Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa*”. 12.

(about 14%), and the majority Hutus (about 85%).⁶ Tribal tension, largely rooted in colonialism, festered between the two tribes. This tension sparked years of conflict that led to genocide of unprecedented proportions. In the first ten weeks of the genocide, an estimated one million people were killed making the atrocities in Rwanda the most severe in Africa.⁷ Rwanda is at the beginning of its recovery and a focus point for U.S. assistance.

Natural Resources

Abundant natural resources define much of the landscape in SSA albeit unevenly. In some regions, lakes and rivers, mineral rich mountain ranges, and forests blanket much of the landscape, while in other areas, limited natural resources and scarce food supplies, to include livestock, exasperate existing levels of poverty and desperation. This imbalance often causes heavy conflict due to disputes over the control of land and water. Countries within SSA, whose economies are dependent on natural resources such as oil and minerals, face high risk of conflict, as are those that have abundant resources, but lack the civil infrastructure or political systems to manage them. Nigeria is a good example. Nigeria possesses vast supplies of oil, a resource that can dramatically boost the region's economy. However, Nigeria is going through a very difficult period of governance and stability. Although Nigeria is the fifth (sometimes sixth) largest supplier of oil imports to the United States, the nation has few systems such as mature accounting measures, secure facilities, and qualified personnel to manage properly the production

⁶ Jim Lehr, "The Tutsis –Hutu Conflict," *Online News Hour*.(June 1999): http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/jan-june99/hutus_tutsis.html (accessed November 6, 2009)

⁷ Lehr, *The Tutsis –Hutu Conflict* .

and sale of oil and oil based products.⁸ Infrastructure to control production is lacking and opportunities for black marketing are rampant. Stolen oil and other criminal activities finance numerous crimes such as the importation of sophisticated weapons by the various militias creating a vicious cycle of unrest that spreads to neighboring countries.⁹ This crime and violence often spreads making it difficult for bordering countries to develop their own governments. As recently as January 2010, a previously unknown armed group attacked a Nigerian oil pipeline to express discontent with the new acting president and send a message that the security apparatuses in the region are ineffective. Continued unrest may affect U.S. economic interests.¹⁰

Economics

Economics plays a major role in the development of SSA. Several countries have undergone steep economic decline over the past two decades, while others such as Ghana have improved and gained international recognition. In support of Ghana's status, during a visit to Ghana in July 2009, President Obama stated that, "the 21st century would be shaped by progressive states like Ghana."¹¹ The positive relationship between governance and economics helped spur the growth in Ghana. Just the opposite is true in other countries. Decline often occurs with the fallout of heavy debt and poorly managed trade practices. Because of economic decline, several governments in SSA find

⁸ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Strengthening U.S. Diplomacy to Anticipate, Prevent And Respond to Conflict in Africa*, 2009, 5.

⁹ Ibid., 5.

¹⁰ CNN, "Nigeria militants claim attack on Shell pipeline". <http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/02/12/nigeria.pipeline.attack/index.html> (accessed February 12, 2010).

¹¹ America.Gov, "Engaging the World". <http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/July/20090711110050abretnuh0.1079783.html> (accessed February 3, 2010).

themselves unable to create jobs, provide reasonable wages, and offer basic public services, all of which are indicators of failing states. When this happens, criminal activity, corruption and violence sometimes becomes the only option, which can lead to failed statehood. This allows for several options such as educational programs and agricultural assistance.

Weak and Failed States

While universal definition for “weak state” or “failed state” exists, some analysts describe state weakness as the erosion of state capacity and a condition characterized by gradations of a state’s ability to govern effectively.¹² Weak and failing states tend to be among the least-developed and most underperforming states in SSA and exhibit more pronounced weaknesses than other, more stable states. The opposite of a “failed state” is an “enduring state” and the dividing line between these two conditions is difficult to ascertain.¹³ A state "succeeds" if it maintains, in the words of Max Weber, a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within its borders. When this monopoly is broken either through the actions of warlords, corrupt officials, or terrorism, the very existence of the state is at risk and is on a glide path to becoming a failed state.¹⁴

¹² Liana Sun Wyler, “Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy,” *CRS Report for Congress*, (August 28, 2008): 8-9.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Maximilian Weber wrote extensively on the social aspects of statehood and the authorities associated with being a functioning state. These theories hold relevance to this thesis because of the links to legitimate social behavior. For more on Maximilian Carl Emil Weber, a German sociologist, see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy found at <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/weber/>.

Weak States

Several countries are either unable or unwilling to make the sacrifices necessary to support their people. This allows the existence of hollow governments, which despite their deficiencies enjoy the principles of sovereignty that allow them to maintain a facade of a functioning statehood. This condition presents assessment challenges for the Department of State in determining where to focus assistance programs.

Becoming a weak state is rarely a rapid process. A key indicator is a fractured and unaccountable security sector. When security fails, systems collapse and the state finds itself unable to provide basic social services or security. The inability to provide basic services and security directly affects development.¹⁵ Weak states have difficulty achieving Millennium Development goals and meeting criteria for U.S. assistance.¹⁶ An additional and somewhat more challenging aspect of weak states is that they can easily become safe-havens for terrorists. Terrorists migrate to weak states because, from their perspective, weak states are safe. Security apparatuses, specifically police and the military are not effective enough to curtail terrorist activity. This condition poses a challenge for the USG because the state is too discombobulated to allow access for U.S. assistance organizations or military-to-military engagements, thus making it difficult to “get to” the terrorists.¹⁷

¹⁵ Wyler, “Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy.” 9.

¹⁶ To receive foreign assistance funds under the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 countries must have achieved certain performance benchmarks, based on quantitative development indicators. For more, see P.L.108-199, H.R. 2673, 22 U.S.C. 7701

¹⁷ Susan Rice, “Weak and Failed States: What They Are, Why They Matter and What To Do About Them.” *Brookings Institute*, (February 26, 2008): 33.

Failed States

Failed states have appeared as a matter of concern in U.S. National Security Strategy documents since 1998 and implicitly informed U.S. national security policy since the end of World War II.¹⁸ The potential threats that failed or failing states pose became more apparent with the attacks on September 11, 2001, which Osama bin Laden masterminded from the support and safe haven that Afghanistan provided.¹⁹ Failed states, just as weak states, have a greater tendency to become safe havens or harbor terrorist bases. This prompted former President George W. Bush to state in the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy and echoed later in a 2005 National Security Presidential Directive that weak states pose a great danger to our national interests.²⁰ The 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy, still applicable to the current administration, acknowledges that security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies.²¹ More recently, Dr. Susan Rice, a foreign policy advisor to President Obama and the current United States Ambassador to the United Nations, stated that “U.S. officials now understand that weak states deserve particular attention because they can incubate transnational threats.”²² This is a problem for the USG because of all the developing

¹⁸ U.S. President, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (March 16, 2006):1.

¹⁹ Wyler, “Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy.” 9.

²⁰ U.S. President, “NSS 2006,”

²¹ Ibid.

²² Rice, “Weak and Failed States: What They Are, Why They Matter and What To Do About Them.” 34-38.

countries worldwide, one-third of these countries are in SSA. Considered weak are developing countries, as they do not possess effective governance structures to provide basic services and security for their people. Even more alarming, 8 of the 20 worst countries worldwide are also in SSA. There are some exceptions like Ghana and Benin, but the overall picture is not an encouraging one.²³

Notable U.S. government and government-affiliated efforts to describe weak and failing states focus on four major and often overlapping factors: peace and stability, effective governance, territorial control and porous borders, and economic sustainability.²⁴ Definitions, provided below, are for context and clarity.²⁵

- 1) **Peace and Stability:** Failing states are often in conflict, at risk of conflict and instability, or emerging from conflict.
- 2) **Effective Governance:** Countries can also be hampered by poor governance, corruption, and inadequate provisions of fundamental public services to its citizens.
- 3) **Territorial Control and Porous Borders:** Weak and failing states may lack effective control of their territory, military, or law enforcement. This allows space where instability can fester. The Sahel region south of Northern Africa is a good example.
- 4) **Economic Sustainability:** Many weak states are also among the poorest countries in the world. Arguably as a consequence of other security and political deficiencies, weak and failing states often lack the conditions to achieve lasting economic development.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) uses the term “fragile states” to include those states that fall along a spectrum of failing, failed, and recovering

²³ Susan Rice, “Weak and Failed States: What They Are, Why They Matter and What To Do About Them.” :36. These countries are Somalia, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Chad, Niger, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic and Sudan.

²⁴ Liana Sun Wyler, “Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy,” 25.

²⁵ Ibid.

from crisis. Several other government organizations offer similar definitions. The one constant is a state's inability or unwillingness to provide services for its people as previously addressed.

Several USG affiliated and private organizations study and measure the vulnerability of states in SSA. The Brookings Institute and The U.S. Fund for Peace are two that provide similar credible data. The Brookings Institute is a nonprofit, public policy organization that conducts research and education in the social sciences, economics, governance, foreign policy, and global economy and development. The U.S. Fund for Peace, is a research and educational organization that works to prevent war and alleviate the conditions that cause war.²⁶ Each organization provides similar data on failed and weak states. This information is important because it demonstrates that SSA exhibits many of the previously addressed challenges and is a prime region for the USG to focus security and development efforts. As previously stated, eight of the world's top twenty failed states are in SSA.²⁷ Furthermore, if no actions are taken, conditions will worsen and the USG will have difficulty exercising its foreign policy. Following in Figure 1, is the Failed State Index (FSI) map as of 3rd Quarter, FY 2009 published in the Foreign Policy Magazine; a bimonthly magazine that focuses on global policy, economics and integration issues. The index depicts that a majority of states in the *Alert* category, considered failed or failing, reside in SSA.

²⁶ U.S. Fund for Peace Failed State Index, *Foreign Policy Magazine*.
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=58&Itemid=87
(accessed November 2, 2009)

²⁷ Ibid.



■ Alert
 ■ Warning
 ■ No Information / Dependent Territory
 ■ Moderate
 ■ Sustainable

Figure 1: Failed State Index Map 2009

Source: U.S. Fund for Peace Failed State Index, *Foreign Policy Magazine* 2009

All countries in the red (*Alert*, FSI of 90 or more), orange (*Warning*, FSI of 60 or more), or yellow (*Moderate*, FSI of 30 or more) categories display some features that make parts of their societies and institutions vulnerable to failure. For example, the United States has a score of 34 out of 120 and is categorized as *moderate*; an indicator of stability. Nigeria has a score of 99.8 out of 120, categorized as *alert*, which indicates state failure. Some in the yellow zone may be failing at a faster rate than those in the orange or red zones; therefore, could experience violence sooner. Conversely, some in the red zone, though critical, may exhibit some positive signs of recovery or be deteriorating slowly, giving them time to adopt mitigating strategies.²⁸ U.S. development and security efforts should target these opportunities.

²⁸ Ibid.

The U.S. Fund for Peace also ranks countries using established indicators to determine their vulnerability to collapse or conflict. The ranking is based on the total scores of twelve indicators of state vulnerability: four social, two economic and six political. For each indicator, the index rates countries on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the lowest intensity or most stable and 10 being the highest intensity or least stable. Provided below are definitions of these terms.²⁹

Social indicators

- a. Demographic pressures: includes the pressures deriving from high population density relative to food supply, settlement patterns, physical settings and border disputes.
- b. Massive movement of refugees and displaced peoples: forced uprooting of large communities because of violence and/or repression.
- c. Legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance based on recent or past injustices.
- d. Chronic and sustained human flight: both the "brain drain" of professionals, intellectuals and political dissidents and voluntary emigration of "the middle class."

Economic indicators

- a. Uneven economic development along group lines: determined by group-based inequality in education, jobs, and economic status.
- b. Sharp and/or severe economic decline: measured by a progressive economic decline of the society as a whole.

²⁹Ibid.

Political indicators

- a. Criminalization and/or de-legitimization of the state: endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites and resistance to accountability and political representation.
- b. Progressive deterioration of public services: a disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence.
- c. Widespread violation of human rights: an emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated.
- d. Security apparatus as 'state within a state': an emergence of elites operates with impunity. Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected "enemies," or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition.
- e. Rise of factionalized elites: a fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines. Use of aggressive nationalistic rhetoric by ruling elites.
- f. Intervention of other states or external factors: military or para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict.

In 2005, in an article in the Washington Post, Condoleezza Rice stated that the United States faced an unparalleled threat from "weak and failing states that serve as global pathways that facilitate the spread of pandemics, the movement of criminals and terrorists and the proliferation of the world's most dangerous weapons."³⁰ Analysts identify numerous links between weak and failing states ranging from terrorism and weapons proliferation to the spread of infectious diseases, environmental degradation, and energy security.³¹ U.S. national security documents generally address weak states in

³⁰ Sonali Huria, "Failing and Failed States," *The Global Discourse*, (July 2008):1-2.

³¹ Wyler, "Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy,"10.

relation to four key threat areas: (1) terrorism, (2) international crime, (3) nuclear proliferation, and (4) regional instability.³² The next section is a brief discussion of these areas to provide context to the strategies of both U.S. AFRICOM and the Bureau of African Affairs. These strategies are discussed later.

Terrorism

Failed states that cannot provide jobs and food for their people, lose territory to warlords, and that can no longer control their borders invite terrorism.³³ Data compiled by the State Department reveals that most U.S. designated foreign terrorist organizations use weak and failing states as their primary bases of operations.³⁴ Al Qaeda, for example, enjoyed access in Eastern Africa where it built training camps, and enlisted new members to plan attacks on U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Accordingly, the United States is seeking to deny terrorists access to weak states.³⁵ U.S. AFRICOM is responding by training African security forces to control their borders and territories more effectively.³⁶

³² Wyler, "Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy," 10.

³³ *New York Times* (New York), July 5, 2005, p. A22.

³⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism* (Office of the Coordinator for Terrorism, Washington, DC. 2003).1

³⁵ Ray Takeyh and Nicholas Gvosdev, "Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?" *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 97–108.

³⁶ U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs Website. <http://www.africom.mil/oef-ts.asp>. (accessed February 3, 2010)

International Crime

As with terrorist groups, international criminal organizations benefit from safe havens that weak and failing states provide. According to a U.S. Interagency Working Group report on international crime, criminals use weak states to move illicit weapons and other contraband. The threat to the SSA continues to grow as criminals exploit the globalization of trade, finance opportunities, and rapid changes in technology. These developments have helped create new mechanisms for trafficking contraband, laundering money, and committing other crimes. They have also opened the door to new criminal opportunities.³⁷ An analysis of the 9/11 Commission report by the Congressional Research Service warns that international terror threats against the United States and local interests are likely to continue to grow in several parts of SSA because of porous borders, lax security, political instability, and a lack of state resources and capacities.³⁸ Sudan and Somalia are prone to this occurrence. For example, recent cooperation between Al Qaeda and the Al Shabab terrorist group threaten security and development efforts in the region.³⁹

³⁷ U.S. Government Interagency Working Group, *International Crime Threat Assessment* (Washington DC. 2009).

³⁸ Francis T. Miko, "Removing Terrorist Sanctuaries: The 9/11 Commission Recommendations and U.S. Policy," *CRS Report for Congress*, (August 10, 2004):7.

³⁹ Somalia's largest homegrown Islamic militant group. Al Shabab, has pledged allegiance to al Qaeda, a sign that, in spite of continuing military pressure on Osama bin Laden's group, it remains a source of inspiration and its influence is spreading. In September 2009 and then again in March 2010, the Shabab group openly announced its support to the Al Qaeda network. For more, see CBS News at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-5328722-503543.html.

Weapons Proliferation

Weak and failing states that are not capable of preventing proliferation of small arms weapons, chemical, biological, and radiological (CBRN) materials and other such equipment may serve as staging areas for networks that smuggle them.⁴⁰ Studies have shown that transshipment points flow through weak and porous borders. For example, the small arms flow between many Central African countries, particularly Mozambique and Angola into the southern Africa region is fueling bloodshed and criminal violence.⁴¹ Moreover, lax regulations, weak governments, and ineffective security forces make trafficking of lethal substances in Africa a real problem.⁴² This problem extends beyond CBRN related weapons. Small arms and light weapons smuggled into SSA pose serious challenges for local police and military forces. These small arms and light weapons destabilize many regions in SSA, obstruct relief efforts and hamper development and construction programs. Furthermore, these weapons foster a culture of violence, often with youth. This concerns U.S. AFRICOM, Department of State and the Bureau for African Affairs as they train African military forces and coordinate peacekeeping activities. Both of which promote regional security.

Regional Instability

According to recent research by the Brookings Institute, states do not become weak or failed in isolation. The research recommended that the U.S. work to encourage

⁴⁰ International Atomic Energy Agency, *Illicit Trafficking Database* (2006),2.

⁴¹ Jaclyn Cock, “Light weapons proliferation: The link between security and development,” *The International Development Research Center*, (November 2008). http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-68073-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html

⁴² Liana Sun Wyler, “Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy,” 12.

structural transformation strategies to improve the facets of the government and society that will prevent weak or failed states from developing.⁴³ Instability has a tendency to spread beyond a weak or failed state's political borders through normal refugee flow, illegal arms smuggling, and other means. Civil wars and strategic destruction of civic infrastructure often sparks community-wide fear of violence resulting in mass migrations, ripples in the economic base, and creates a drain on natural resources and civic support.⁴⁴ Sub-Saharan Africa will remain the region most vulnerable to regional and political instability, economic disruption, population stresses and civil conflict.⁴⁵

Illicit Drugs

Drug money often fuels corruption and replaces legitimate sources of income. Rises in drug trafficking in recent years have drawn the attention of U.S. policy makers. Moreover, President Obama, in a trip to Ghana in July 2009, said, "...drug trafficking threatens stability in Africa."⁴⁶ The USG is not taking this lightly. The 110th Congress passed a law that required that the Department of Defense submit a report to Congress laying out a counternarcotics strategy for the region, among other related goals. This issue was also the primary focus of a recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee

⁴³ Ernest Areetey, "Structural Transformations in SSA," Brookings Institute (November 2009) 2010): 1-2, <http://www.brookings.edu/topics/africa.aspx?page=2>

⁴⁴ Paul Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap* (Washington DC: Oxford University Press), 14-16.

⁴⁵ Lisa Sun Wyler, "Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy," *CRS Report for Congress*, (August 28, 2008): 8.

⁴⁶ President, Remarks, *Remarks by the President to the Ghanaian Parliament* (July 11, 2009), and White House, *Readout of the President's Call with President Mills of Ghana*, Office of the Press Secretary, (April 10, 2009).

hearing.⁴⁷ Illicit drug trafficking has implications for U.S. interests. Historically, U.S. policy makers focused relatively little attention to counter-narcotics in SSA, largely because the potential consequences for the United States arising from drug trafficking were limited. The situation has changed. Expanded drug trafficking in SSA threatens Europe and Asia. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency investigative efforts have found significant increases in SSA's utilization as transshipment, storage, cultivation, and manufacturing point for narcotics destined for Europe, and, to a lesser extent, other consumer markets, including the United States. Weak governments, endemic corruption, and ill-equipped law enforcement agencies cultivate this condition.⁴⁸ Increased drug trafficking in SSA may directly jeopardize other U.S. foreign and economic policy goals, such as the promotion of legitimate economic growth and disease prevention, and other programs such as agricultural training. It could also put at risk DOD-supported peacekeeping operations and post-conflict reconstruction assistance that the United States and other have invested in the region.

The above research addressed four threat areas that impact upon U.S. national interests and potentially impact global interests as well. Of the threats addressed, terrorism holds the most danger for the United States and Africa; and as recent events show, affects other countries worldwide. As addressed above, weak or failed states attract terrorism largely because of weak security apparatuses and other factors. Several elements within the USG work hard to prevent the spread of terrorism in SSA. This

⁴⁷ Liana Sun Wyler, "Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy," *CRS Report for Congress*, (August 28, 2008):2.

⁴⁸ U.S. Department of Justice, *Confronting Drug Trafficking in Western Africa* (Washington DC., June 30, 2009):3-5.

threat not only concerns the United States, but also many African leaders. Organizations such as the African Union and many African militaries actively work to prevent an increase of terrorist acts. Furthermore, this threat, in addition to the others previously addressed, will continue to hinder development and security if not addressed.

An Historical Perspective

To understand the contrasting impacts of failed statehood, this section examines the countries of Liberia and Ghana. This thesis examines these two countries because each demonstrates the potential to propel the region of West Africa into a leading hub for regional prosperity, and, furthermore, help make several other countries in SSA, such as Mali, Benin, and Senegal, positive members of the global market. Of several countries in SSA, despite its vast amount of natural resources, Liberia experienced a high number of years of violence, political corruption, and economic downslide, and only now is on a glide-path to developing a prosperous and effective government capable of providing of providing basic services to its people. For over 50 years, the United States and Ghana have enjoyed a positive relationship largely due to the economic and political leadership that Ghana displays.

Liberia

The history of Liberia is unique among African nations, notably because of its relationship with the United States. The American Colonization Society founded Liberia as a colony in 1822 as a place for slaves freed in the United States to emigrate to Africa

on the premise they would have greater freedom and equality.⁴⁹ The freedom and equality did not come easy; in fact, for many it did not come at all. Two events were particularly important in lifting Liberia from its early isolation. The first was in 1926 when the American-owned Firestone Company established a plant in Liberia. The labor force was abundant and the primary resource, rubber, was plentiful. This event created many jobs for the common Liberian and boosted other aspects of the economy as well. Another event occurred during World War II, when the United States began providing technical and economic assistance that enabled Liberia to progress and stimulate its economy. Additionally, during World War II, U.S. personnel built two major airports in Liberia, the Freeport of Monrovia and Roberts International.⁵⁰ This opened an avenue for trade to grow.

In 1988, after 50 years of profit for the country, Firestone sold the Liberian based plant to a Japanese firm causing Liberia's economy to plummet.⁵¹ Also during this decade, the then-President Samuel Doe recruited soldiers from his own tribe into the armed forces and used them to harass other ethnic groups. Associates that were hand-picked by Doe, contributed to the corruption in the country and led to the collapse of the state bureaucracy and security services.⁵² Over a decade of civil war displaced nearly

⁴⁹ U.S. Department of State, *Diplomacy in Action Founding of Liberia, 1847*. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/dwe/16337.htm>. (accessed October 1, 2009). For more on the American Colonization Society, see Library of Congress Resource at [www](http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/african/afam002.html). <http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/african/afam002.html>

⁵⁰ John-Peter Pham, *Liberia: Portrait of a Failed State* (New York: Reed Press, 2004), 40

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Mark Malan, "Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Mixed Results from Humble Beginnings," <http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/> (accessed October 3, 2009), 1.

one third of Liberia's population and took the lives of approximately 250,000 people.⁵³

Liberia slipped into a crisis state. Unemployment was rampant; public and private institutions were fractured, as was foreign investment. Distribution of water and electricity was sporadic at best and often controlled by warlords. The capital city of Monrovia had grown from a city with a prewar population of 300,000 to well over a million people and lacked the civic infrastructure to support the growth. Professionals, such as doctors and lawyers were scarce with only an estimated twenty-five medical doctors in the country to care for a population of approximately 3 million people.⁵⁴

After the ousting of Doe and the end of a civil war in 1997, Liberia held elections to install a functional government. The intent of the elections was to produce a government capable of providing safety and security to the Liberian people. Charles Taylor became president and began to use various state security agencies as his own private militia.⁵⁵ The conditions of the election mandated that the winner, in this case Charles Taylor, restructure the army, police, and other institutions to reflect the neutrality of the administration. However, Taylor did not adhere to the mandate and resisted the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to oversee a process of security sector reform, and proceeded to marginalize the national army.⁵⁶

⁵³ Stephen Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy* (New York Press, 2006).75

⁵⁴Mark Malan, "Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Mixed Results from Humble Beginnings," <http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/> (accessed October 3, 2009),1.

⁵⁵John-Peter Pham, *Liberia: Portrait of a Failed State* (New York: Reed Press, 2004), 112.

⁵⁶ECOWAS was organized in 1975. One of its major goals is to bring together the economies of the mostly small nations, hoping the combined economic power would allow the countries to compete better than any one state could do on its own. <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/liberia/ecowas-background.html>.

Instead of developing the security sector, Taylor recruited security forces headed by long-standing supporters.⁵⁷

Human rights abuse was rampant in Liberia under Taylor's regime. Security personnel often intimidated and bullied the public through torture, wrongful arrests, and the use of official powers for private gains. This created an atmosphere of deep mistrust of law enforcement and military officials. The police and military were not regarded as a source of protection, but rather a source of fear and mistrust. This state of political corruption, ungoverned security practices, and lack of services continued for years. Liberia held elections in October 2005, with a presidential runoff in November that same year. The elections pitted the forces of Charles Taylor against two anti-Taylor groups, destabilizing neighboring states, which accepted Liberian refugees, and in some cases, hosted anti-Taylor forces. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, an economist, won the presidential runoff vote, with 59.4% of votes cast and took office in mid-January 2006, becoming the first female president of an African country.⁵⁸

In March 2006, after arresting him, Nigeria sent former President Taylor to the U.S.-supported Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) to face war crimes charges. In early February 2009, the Prosecutor's Office of the SCSL rested its case after presenting 91 witnesses against former Liberian President Charles Taylor. As of the time of this writing, Taylor is still on trial. Extreme violence, corrupt leadership, criminal activity and an unwillingness to provide basic services to the population characterized Liberia up

⁵⁷Malan, "Security Sector Reform". 3

⁵⁸Nicolas Cook. "Liberia's Post-War Recovery: Key Issues and Developments." *Congressional Research Service*, (February 19, 2009): i. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33185.pdf>. (accessed September 28, 2009)

until the election of President Sirleaf. These factors are indicative of state failure as previously discussed.

Although late to need, the USG recognizes that Liberia holds great promise and is working aggressively with Liberia to develop its government and security structure. More importantly, the USG recognizes that if left to fester, the conditions that contributed to the downslide of the Liberian government over the past 10-15 years will also prevent Liberia from reaching its potential. Such instability could very well spill over into the other countries triggering regional collapse and would be detrimental to both SSA and the United States. In efforts to move Liberia along through partnership rather than ‘ownership’, the United States provides about \$160 million in aid to Liberia annually, which covers security-sector reform, improved education and health care, road construction, and improved democratic governance. Additionally, the United States has spent an equal amount to help rebuild Liberia’s army, which will provide security and protect human rights.⁵⁹ All indicators are that Liberia will improve and eventually be on par with other West African countries.

Ghana

In contrast, the country of Ghana serves as an example of democratic success in SSA. Ghana is located on West Africa's Gulf of Guinea slightly north of the equator and has a relatively diverse and rich natural resource base. As with several African countries, Ghana was under colonial rule and gained independence on March 6, 1957, when Britain

⁵⁹ Charles W. Corey, “Good U.S.-Liberian Relations Help Liberia Build Its Future.” [http. www.america.gov](http://www.america.gov) October 21, 2008. (accessed February 25, 2010)

relinquished its control over the colony of the former Gold Coast (now Ghana) and surrounding areas.⁶⁰

After independence, Ghana aimed to become a modern, semi-industrialized state that provided jobs for its people and integrated with other governments.⁶¹ This was not an easy path. The existing regime did not fully support democracy or change. On July 1, 1960, three years after independence Ghana adopted a new constitution, reforming the system that existed under colonial rule to a republican form of government headed by a powerful president. This system did not easily translate to success. The new president, Kwame Nkrumah, abused his power. He censored the media, controlled security forces, and set conditions for turmoil. In 1966, a mere nine years after independence was granted, Nkrumah was overthrown and a one-party, democratic government was put in place.⁶² This historic change in leadership served as the foundation for the growth and recognition that Ghana enjoys today.

Today, Ghana is the fourth largest market for U.S. exports in SSA. Democracy is spreading, business is growing, and trade and investments are rising.⁶³ Ghana's emphasis on good governance, education, fiscal management and effective politics won it the acclaim of the United States. Ghana's average annual growth rate of 5.6 percent during

⁶⁰ U.S. Department of State. Diplomacy in Action. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2860.htm> (accessed September 29, 2009)

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Nicolas Cook, "Ghana: Background and U.S. Relations," *CRS Report for Congress*, (January 6, 2009): 1-2. Also, for more on Ghanaian history, see <http://africanhistory.about.com/od/ghana/p/GhanaHist1.htm> (accessed September 22, 2009).

⁶³ Ibid.

the past six years has been one of Africa's highest.⁶⁴ Social indicators have steadily improved. Ghana reportedly may become the first African country to surpass the United Nations Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty by 2015.⁶⁵ The government of Ghana is also a leading force in regional diplomatic and peacekeeping initiatives. The Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) is arguably the most professional and disciplined force in the region. The United States, through the assistance of U.S. AFRICOM, provides military support to Ghana through a variety of programs, including the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program.⁶⁶ Ghana reaches outside its borders to provide assistance to other countries as well. Currently, Ghana has 3,267 peacekeepers deployed to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations and large contingents deployed in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Darfur region of Sudan, Lebanon, Liberia, and Cote d'Ivoire, with smaller contingents deployed in Chad, Western Sahara, Kosovo, Southern Sudan, and Republic of Georgia.⁶⁷

The relationship between Ghana and the United States creates an important strategic balance for SSA. The United States is one of Ghana's principal trading partners. Other major trading partners include Nigeria, China, U.K., Germany, Togo, France, and

⁶⁴ Sergio P. Leiete, Anthony Pellichio, Luisa Zanforlin, Girma Begashaw, Stefania Fabrizio, and Joachim Harnack. *Ghana: Economic Development in a Democratic Environment*. (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2000), 1-6.

⁶⁵ Cook, "Ghana: Background and U.S. Relations." 4. Furthermore, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are a set of development targets agreed centered on halving poverty and improving the welfare by 2015. The IMF contributes to this effort through its advice, technical assistance, and lending to countries, as well as its role in mobilizing donor support.

⁶⁶ U.S. AFRICOM Posture Statement, March 13, 2008. <http://www.africom.mil>, (accessed August 10, 2009).

⁶⁷ U.S. Department of State. Diplomacy in Action. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2860.htm> (accessed September 29, 2009).

the Netherlands. Ghana and the United States also work closely to develop closer economic ties in the private sector. In fact, several major U.S. companies, such as DHL, FedEx, UPS and Coca Cola operate freely in the Ghanaian market. Mining companies and agricultural businesses from the U.S. increased their investments in Ghana recently.⁶⁸ Political stability, sound economic management, low crime rates and competitive wages have increased Ghana's potential to serve as a West African hub for U.S. businesses. In short, Ghana continues to hold great promise for U.S. interests and regional growth.

Summary

This century has brought new transnational challenges to SSA that were previously common mostly outside its borders. Violence, corruption, and poor governance are some of the leading causes of failed statehood and warrant attention from the United States. Other merging issues such as terrorism and illicit drug trafficking infect SSA and contribute to the challenges facing the USG. These factors coupled with climate change, illegal exploitation of resources and pandemic diseases such as HIV/AIDS and malaria, are all eroding SSA's ability to be a productive member in a global society.

This chapter provided the context necessary to understand why progress in SSA slow at best. Data from the U.S. Fund for Peace and the Brookings Institute illuminated the most common causes of conflict and corruption and established factors and criteria for weak or failed in SSA. Liberia, as a country that experienced high levels of conflict and turmoil, illustrated the debilitating effects of conflict and corruption. In contrast,

⁶⁸ U.S. Department of State, Diplomacy in Action, *U.S. and Ghana Relations*. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2860.htm#relations>, (accessed February 26, 2010).

Ghana highlighted the path to an enduring state. As long as weak or failed states exist, execution of U.S. foreign policy will be challenging for the Departments of State and Defense. The above challenges provide a good point of reference to focus U.S. policy for Africa. Such policy will help spread democracy, create more states that are prosperous and promote regional security in sub-Saharan Africa.

Ambassador Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, put it best in saying, “....the 21st century will not be shaped merely in the capitals of super-powers, but also by the continent of Africa and its leaders as well.”⁶⁹ U.S. foreign policy should reflect this reality and work to focus on smaller developing countries as well as superpowers. Policy that focuses on select developing countries will create stable states that serve as role models and ultimately help spread democracy, create prosperity, enhance regional security, and ultimately help achieve U.S. interests in the region.

⁶⁹Ambassador Johnnie Carson, “Policy Plans for Africa” (lecture, Center for American Progress, Washington, DC, September 15, 2009).

CHAPTER 4

POLICIES and STAKEHOLDERS

Introduction

The U.S. Government has not historically identified issues in Africa as strategic priorities. Furthermore, U.S. military engagement in Africa, prior to the activation of U.S. AFRICOM, has been sporadic.¹ According to one defense analyst, “during the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy toward sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) had little to do with Africa.”² After the fall of the Soviet Union, many U.S. policymakers considered the U.S. military roles and responsibilities on the continent to be minimal. In 1995, the Department of Defense outlined its view of Africa in its U.S. Security Strategy for SSA, asserting that, “ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.”³ A few years later, in 1998, terrorists attacked two U.S. embassies in East Africa signaling a turning point in U.S. strategic policy toward the region.⁴ It is important to understand U.S. foreign policy and supporting department level strategies because each emphasizes security and development activities in SSA and support the National Security Strategy.

The following section reviews U.S. National Security and Defense strategies, Department of State (DOS) strategic goals, to include those of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of Defense (DOD) strategic

¹ Lauren Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa.”(July 28, 2009), App B.

² Letitia Lawson, “U.S. Africa Policy since the Cold War,” *Strategic Insights*, Vol. VI, Issue 1, (January 2007): 3-4.

³ U.S. Department of Defense, *U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa*, (Washington, DC, 1995),1.

⁴ Ibid.

objectives with emphasis on U.S. AFRICOM. Furthermore, the section demonstrates linkages between the policies and strategies to illustrate where joint strategy can occur. Lastly, the following examines other stakeholders in SSA such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).⁵ This thesis examines these areas to provide clarity on the entities responsible for planning, resourcing and executing security and development in SSA.

National Security Strategy

As stated in the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), American interests are enduring and provide focus for USG efforts across the globe.⁶ In sum, the interests are:

- The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners;
- A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;
- Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and
- An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.

These interests extend to U.S. involvement in Africa. The NSS states that the diversity and complexity of the African continent offer the United States opportunities and challenges.⁷ The President, as articulated in the NSS, states that economic, security, and political cooperation are key focus points in Africa. The NSS further adds that the administration will refocus its priorities on strategic interventions that can promote job

⁵ The African Union is a pan-African organization whose goal is to propel a united continent towards peace and prosperity. The Economic Community of West African States is a regional group of fifteen countries that promotes economic integration in all fields of economic activity, social and cultural matters. For more, see www.african.org and www.ecowas.int/.

⁶ U.S. President, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,(March 27, 2010):7

⁷ Ibid., 45

creation and economic growth. An extremely important venture for SSA, articulated in the NSS, is combating corruption while strengthening good governance and accountability. It also addresses reinforcing sustainable stability in key states that are essential sub-regional hubs of progress.⁸ These statements emphasize the importance of a joint strategy for security and development in SSA.

National Defense Strategy

The National Defense Strategy (NDS), as the military's capstone document in supporting the President of the United States long-term efforts, has significant stake in promoting the goal of helping to create democratic, well-governed states. As such, the Department of Defense would benefit as well from a joint strategy as previously addressed, as it would link their efforts with those of the Department of State.

The NDS flows from the NSS and outlines how DOD contributes to the NSS objectives. The strategic objectives for the NDS are Defend the Homeland, Win the Long War, Promote Security, Deter Conflict, and Win our Nation's Wars. Through these objectives, the NDS provides a framework for DOD strategic guidance to focus campaign and contingency planning, force development, and management of intelligence.⁹ The NDS specifically addresses unified efforts for both planning and implementing policy. The NDS specifically addresses a whole-of-government approach in coordinating national security planning across all U.S. government agencies and DOD.¹⁰ The strategic approach within U.S. AFRICOM, complemented by its

⁸ Ibid., 45.

⁹ Secretary of Defense, "The National Defense Strategy," (June 2008):1.

¹⁰ SECDEF, "NDS 2008,"

organizational structure is a good example. Besides a three-star deputy commander, U.S. AFRICOM has a senior Department of State official serving as the deputy to the commander for Civil Military-Affairs.¹¹ This posting represents a serious effort to bridge the gap between DOD and DOS, promotes a whole-of government approach and, complements DOD and USAID initiatives.

U.S. Department of State

The Department of State (DOS) plays a very important role in the development of SSA. U.S. foreign policy recognizes empowering people and achieving development requires more than charity or even open-ended funding.¹² Furthermore, the policy is committed to peace and security, democracy, economic integration and humanitarian assistance, all of which represent goals outlined in the National Security and Defense strategies.¹³ Stalled development and continuing poverty in SSA concerns the USG in part because Africa has been an important focus of U.S. assistance programs for years. As such, the United States must execute a progressive foreign policy with SSA to promote growth and develop a strong partnership.

The U.S. Secretary of State is the foreign minister of the United States and the primary conductor of state-to-state diplomacy. The Secretary of State oversees the mission of advancing freedom for the benefit of the American people and others by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, well-governed states that respond

¹¹ U.S. AFRICOM Command Brief downloaded October 23, 2009 from the JFSC portal.

¹² U.S. Secretary of State, *U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development's Strategic Plan for FY2007 to FY2012*, (Washington, DC, 2006): 5. This is a collaborative plan between the two agencies. USAID executes its programs in accordance with Department of State policy guidance.

¹³ Ibid. 44

to the needs of their people, reduce poverty, and act responsibly within the international system.¹⁴

The Department of State and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) developed a Joint Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2007 to 2012, which laid out direction and priorities for both organizations. In this plan, strategic goals define primary aims of U.S. foreign policy and development assistance. All of the goals target some of the challenges in SSA previously addressed. Additionally, these goals nest with those of Department of Defense. Below are the goals for context and understanding.¹⁵

Seven Strategic Goals

Strategic Goal 1: Achieving Peace and Security

- Counterterrorism
- Weapons of mass destruction and destabilizing conventional weapons
- Security cooperation and security sector reform
- Conflict prevention, mitigation, and response
- Transnational crime
- Homeland security

Strategic Goal 2: Governing Justly and Democratically

- Rule of law and human rights
- Good governance
- Political competition and consensus building
- Civil society

Strategic Goal 3: Investing in People

- Health
- Education
- Social services and protection for especially vulnerable populations

¹⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Diplomacy in Action*, (Washington, DC, 2009), <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/107330.htm>, (accessed November 18, 2009).

¹⁵ U.S. Secretary of State, *U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development's Strategic Plan for FY2007 to FY2012*, (Washington, DC, 2006): 10-11.

Strategic Goal 4: Promoting Economic Growth and Prosperity

- Private markets
- Trade and investment
- Energy security
- Environment
- Agriculture

Strategic Goal 5: Providing Humanitarian Assistance

- Protection, assistance, and solutions
- Disaster prevention and mitigation
- Orderly and humane means for migration management

Strategic Goal 6: Promoting International Understanding

- Offer a positive vision
- Marginalize extremism
- Nurture common interests and values

Strategic Goal 7: Strengthening Consular and Management Capabilities

- Consular services
- Major management functions

Goals one through five focuses on development and security while the remaining two goals are more diplomatic in nature. Of note, the sub-characteristics of goals one through five are similar to the causes of conflict and characteristics of failed states previously addressed. As stated in the DOS and USAID Strategy for 2007-2012, it is impossible to draw clear lines between our security interests, our development efforts, and our democratic ideals. This statement argues for a joint strategy to un-blur the lines.

United States Agency for International Development

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has and continues to be the lead agency promoting many facets of development in 47 countries in SSA. For example, in December 2009, in Ghana, USAID collaborated with the World Health organization, International Red Cross and other organizations and worked with 16 sub-Saharan countries to discuss pandemic contingency disaster relief. U.S. AFRICOM

participated as well, again pointing to the relevance of a joint strategy.¹⁶ USAID assistance to SSA works to help institutions and organizations incorporate good governance principles and innovative approaches to health, education, economic growth, agriculture, and the environment.¹⁷ USAID developed priorities to focus its efforts in SSA. Following are these priorities.

USAID Priorities in sub-Saharan Africa

- Enhance Strategic partnerships
- Consolidate democratic transitions
- Bolster fragile states
- Strengthen regional and sub-regional organizations
- Strengthen counterterrorism cooperation and capacity
- Stimulate economic development and growth
- Implement presidential initiatives
- Promote humanitarian and development assistance

Inherent to the success of these priorities, the governments of SSA must be self sufficient and capable of providing services to their people. In support of the USAID priorities, U.S. assistance to Africa has four over-arching objectives.¹⁸ These objectives are governing justly and democratically, investing in people, economic growth and humanitarian assistance. Reviewed below are these goals.

Governing Justly and Democratically

To enhance stability and increase the capacity of governments to govern justly, the United States provides support to strengthen SSA's democratic institutions,

¹⁶ Tim Collier, "West African nations collaborate in pandemic flu planning workshop," *Army News* 2009, December 16, 2009. [http:// www.army.mil/news/2009/12/16/32322-west-african-nations-collaborate-in-parade](http://www.army.mil/news/2009/12/16/32322-west-african-nations-collaborate-in-parade). (accessed January 23, 2010)

¹⁷ U.S. Secretary of State, *U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development's Strategic Plan for FY2007 to FY2012*, (Washington, DC, 2006): 10-11.

¹⁸ Ibid. 2

professionalize security forces, and promote key reforms. An example is USAID's Women's Justice and Empowerment Initiative, which seeks to help the governments in several SSA countries improve their ability to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate gender-based violence and provide support to victims.¹⁹

Investing in People

Diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis are serious threats to improving health capacity in the region. The USG recognizes that these diseases hinder growth, education and overall life span. Two major initiatives to improve conditions and reverse the trend are the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Presidents' Malaria Initiative (PMI). Sub-Saharan Africa is the primary focus for both programs.²⁰ USAID works in partnership with PEPFAR, contributing roughly 60 percent of its funding. Ambassador Tony Holmes, U.S. Africa Command's deputy to the commander for civil military activities, stressed the importance of these programs to the command's mission. He said, "there's nothing that the U.S. government does in Africa that is more appreciated, that is better targeted, and that is as appropriate as for us to engage in an effort to fight HIV/AIDS in militaries."²¹ This illustrates another area where a joint strategy has merit.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of State, *Diplomacy in Action*, (Washington, DC, 2009), [http:// www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov). (accessed December 6, 2009).

²⁰ PEPFAR provides significant funding to African countries experiencing the most serious effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The President's Malaria Initiative provides prevention and treatment initiatives with the goal of reducing mortality by half.

²¹ U.S. AFRICOM newsletter. Downloaded from U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs. <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=3758>. (accessed January 24, 2010)

Economic Growth

The central challenge facing SSA is to reduce poverty through higher levels of economic growth.²² This growth is essential to increase incomes and increase SSA's potential to become a significant trade and investment partner. African economies have continued to sustain the growth momentum of the 1990s, recording an overall real GDP growth rate of 5.8 percent in 2007. More than 30 sub-Saharan African countries recorded higher economic growth rates in 2007 than 2006. Building on the success of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), diplomatic and development resources help facilitate increased cross-border, regional, and international trade.²³ Economic growth is critical to building and maintaining enduring statehood across SSA. Economic growth in SSA will enhance the missions of Departments of State and Defense by supporting a variety of programs executed by USAID and U.S. AFRICOM.

Humanitarian Assistance

Both DOS and DOD work to both prevent and respond to humanitarian crises to raise awareness and support for improved disaster preparedness, mitigation, and response capacity.²⁴ USAID has provided assistance for relief of famine and natural disaster in several countries in SSA and the Horn of Africa.²⁵ U.S. AFRICOM supports the humanitarian assistance efforts of USAID through its military-to-military activities, which

²² U.S. Agency for International Development, *Economic Growth*, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/sectors/eg/index.html. (accessed January 24, 2010.)

²³ The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was signed into law on May 18, 2000 as Title 1 of The Trade and Development Act of 2000. The Act offers tangible incentives for African countries to continue their efforts to open their economies and build free markets.

²⁴ U.S. Department of State, *Diplomacy in Action*, (Washington, DC, 2009), <http://www.state.gov>. (accessed December 6, 2009).

²⁵ Ibid.

include training missions, field exercises, and training African militaries. In fact, the commander of U.S. AFRICOM commented that military-to-military activities have positive effects and AFRICOM recognizes the importance of such activities.²⁶

U.S. Africa Policy

The U.S. Government (USG) was long overdue for an update on its Africa policy. In fact, prior to the current strategic objectives, President George H.W. Bush signed the last policy in 1992. To bridge the gap, the strategic objectives for Africa, as outlined by former President George W. Bush in National Security Presidential Directive 50 (NSPD-50) on September 28, 2006 were building state capacity, promoting economic development, bolstering fragile states and strengthening security apparatuses. Additionally, it emphasized humanitarian and development assistance. Each of these objectives is critical to the security and development in sub-Saharan Africa. Of note, these objectives overlap those of both DOS and DOD.

United States policy for Africa drives development and security activities in SSA. It is important to synchronize the efforts of USAID, DOD and other stakeholders. The United States implemented a strategy to operate more effectively and efficiently in an environment where many threats exist.²⁷ Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in a foreign policy address to the Council of Foreign Relations said, “the U.S. approach to foreign

²⁶ U.S. Agency for International Development, *Frontlines*, (December-January 2009), <http://www.army.mil/-ews/2009/01/12/15912-us-africa-command-general-hails-usaid-military-links/>. (accessed January 24, 2010).

²⁷ Phillip Carter, “U.S. Policy for Africa in the 21st Century,” (lecture, The Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, February 9, 2009).

policy must reflect the world as it is, not as it used to be.”²⁸ To that end, the foreign policy objectives for SSA are rooted in security, political, economic and humanitarian interests. Additionally, the foreign policy objectives include denying terrorist safe havens in failed states; helping African nations conserve their natural resources, and ending conflict and internal wars throughout the region.²⁹

The United States understands that there are new, emerging strategic powers in SSA. Nations such as South Africa have used their diplomatic, economic, and military power to shape the continent for the better. Mali, Ghana, Botswana and Benin established effective governments as well. Visits to these and other prospering countries by the current administration underscore the United States’ commitment and reaffirms U.S. national interest in the region.³⁰ The USG must work hard with these countries to help them spread positive influence throughout the region.

Bureau of African Affairs

The Bureau of African Affairs is the lead Department of State bureau that oversees U.S. State department sponsored development programs in SSA. It is important that the objectives of this bureau and those of U.S. AFRICOM support each other to synchronize development and security activities in addition to other programs. The Bureau of African Affairs, established in 1958, is one of eight bureaus within the Department of State. The bureaus’ regional responsibilities then covered Africa from the

²⁸ Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, (lecture, Council of Foreign Relations, Washington DC, July 15, 2009).

²⁹ Senate Committee, *Nomination Hearing*, January 13, 2009, 5-9

³⁰ President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton visited Ghana in June and August 2009 respectively.

Straits of Gibraltar to the Cape of Good Hope.³¹ For the purposes of diplomacy, Egypt and the rest of North Africa (Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Algeria and Egypt) were included in the Bureau of Near East Asian Affairs, leaving those African states south of the Sahel within the regional responsibility of the Bureau of African Affairs.³² The Bureau is not without challenges.

According to an August 2009 Inspector General report, leadership shortcomings within the Bureau often compound acute staffing problems. Senior officials run from one crisis to another and remain challenged to mobilize and deploy significant teams of experts and resources. For example, the team that led the negotiations to end the civil war in Sudan disbanded and the capacity was lost to competing requirements elsewhere.³³ Embassy platforms are collapsing under the weight of new programs and need resources to respond early to indicators of stress, to help resolve conflicts and assist weak governing institutions. Another shortfall is that policy planning focuses on near term contingencies, such as outbreaks of violence, upcoming elections, or ailing leadership rather than long-range strategic issues.³⁴ These shortfalls provide joint opportunities for DOS and DOD, and in some cases, the use of DOD assets is a viable solution.

Within the bureau, Ambassador Johnnie Carson, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, is chartered to oversee execution of U.S. foreign policy in Africa. In

³¹ U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, *Inspection of the Bureau of African Affairs* (Washington DC, August 2009). 3

³² The Sahel is the transitional zone between the Sahara and the tropical savanna near the Sudan region.

³³ Senate Committee Hearing , *Strengthening U.S. Diplomacy to Africa*, April 21, 200., 2

³⁴ U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, *Inspection of the Bureau of African Affairs* (Washington DC, August 2009).15

a September 21, 2009 speech at the Center for American Progress, Ambassador Carson said, “U.S. policy towards Africa will emphasize mutual responsibility and that commitment will not be measured in monetary or programmatic assistance.”

Furthermore, he stated that success would be anchored on building partnerships and local capacity to support transformation and reduce the need for outside assistance.³⁵ This statement clearly highlights the importance of development and security in the region.

Ambassador Carson stated that the Bureau would focus on five areas of critical importance that reflect America’s core values and interests as well as issues of significance and importance to the region.³⁶ These areas, discussed below, provide focus for the bureau and opportunities for collaboration with DOD.

- 1) partnership with African governments and civil society.
- 2) work for sustained economic development and growth.
- 3) maintain a focus on health issues and health delivery systems.
- 4) work with the international community and African states and leaders to prevent, mitigate and resolve interstate conflicts and disputes.
- 5) help Africa fight transnational threats

Department of Defense and U.S. AFRICOM

The Department of Defense (DOD) organizes its command structure by dividing its activities among joint military commands based either on a geographic or functional

³⁵ Ambassador Johnnie Carson, “A New Beginning: U.S. Policy in Africa,”(lecture, Center for American Progress, Washington DC, September 15, 2009),3.

³⁶ Ibid. 4,5.

area of responsibility (AOR).³⁷ Previously, U.S. military involvement in Africa was divided among three geographic commands: U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). On February 6, 2007, the Bush Administration announced the creation of U.S. Africa Command to promote U.S. national security objectives in Africa and its surrounding waters. Some DOD officials have referred to U.S. AFRICOM as a combatant command “plus” implying that the command has all the roles and responsibilities of a traditional combatant command, including the ability to facilitate or lead military operations; but also includes a broader “soft power” mandate aimed at building a stable security environment.³⁸ The formation of U.S. AFRICOM is linked to a number of geostrategic and security considerations that the United States is facing in Africa, most notably humanitarian and development interests, energy security, terrorism and failed and failing states.³⁹

The U.S. AFRICOM mission is to conduct sustained security engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.⁴⁰ This mission statement is informed by the guidance provided in the 2008

³⁷A unified combatant command is defined as “a command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments that is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” according to DOD’s Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

³⁸Lauren Ploch, “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,” *CRS Report for Congress*, (December 7, 2007): 5.

³⁹Peter W. Singer, “AFRICOM: The Road Ahead for U.S. AFRICOM.” (transcript of VADM Robert T. Moeller, Brookings Institute, Washington DC., May 27, 2008).

⁴⁰U.S. AFRICOM Posture Statement. Downloaded from <http://www.africom.mil/>. (accessed December 22, 2009).

National Defense Strategy of supporting a whole-of government approach between all agencies and Department of Defense. The commander's vision for U.S. AFRICOM points out that the command develops and implements military programs to enhance stability and security and develop military capabilities across SSA. Additionally, U.S. AFRICOM, as a trusted and reliable partner works to build strong governance in Africa. In fact, as of September 1, 2009, more than 1,200 personnel were assigned; half of whom are civilian employees, including representatives from non-military agencies of the U.S. government.⁴¹ Additionally, the staff organization of U.S. AFRICOM is not that of the traditional 'J-staff' design, rather it is organized to support development, stability, reconstruction and threat prevention. For example, the staff has a senior development advisor that reports directly to the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military affairs.

Security and development in SSA cannot work without the efforts of U.S. AFRICOM as it has major stake in developing security apparatuses across the region. As previously stated, U.S. AFRICOM supports Department of State activities through its' military-to-military activities and other programs. Additionally, U.S. AFRICOM works to support a "three pronged" government approach where first it takes the lead on security issues, secondly fulfills a supporting role to the diplomatic efforts of DOS and lastly, or the third prong, supports the development efforts of USAID.⁴² This three-pronged approach serves as a good foundation for a joint strategy.

⁴¹ U.S. AFRICOM Fact Sheet, September 9, 2009. <http://www.africom.mil> (accessed December 22, 2009).

⁴² Ploch, "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa," 5.

U.S. AFRICOM's area of responsibility (AOR) includes all African countries except Egypt, which remains in the AOR of CENTCOM. Of note, the geographic boundaries of U.S. AFRICOM do not match those of the Department of State bureaus in that region. This is not a significant problem, but adds another layer of coordination and resource challenges between the departments, USAID and U.S. AFRICOM.

Stakeholders

The United States does not hold a monopoly on the stakeholders interested in improving SSA. Both the Department of State and Defense must work closely with the other stakeholders that invest in the future of Africa. Organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) work closely to build independent and functional countries. ECOWAS is a regional group of fifteen countries, founded in 1975. Its mission is to promote economic integration in all fields of economic activity, particularly industry, transport, energy, agriculture, natural resources and commerce.⁴³ The AU is another powerful and important organization invested in Africa's future. Originally started in 1999 as the Organization for African Unity, the AU is Africa's premier institution and principal organization for the promotion of socio-economic integration and growth between African countries and peoples. The AU's common vision is to unite all of Africa and to build a partnership between governments and all segments of civil society, in particular women and youth. The United States was the first major non-African country to appoint

⁴³ ECOWAS was organized in 1975. One of its major goals is to bring together the economies of the mostly small nations, hoping the combined economic power would allow the countries to compete better than any one state could do on its own. For more on ECOWAS, see <http://www.ecowas.int/>.

a full-time ambassador to the African Union (AU), showing the commitment of the USG. Furthermore, U.S. AFRICOM works closely with the AU to accomplish its mission.

Summary

Execution of U.S. foreign policy will be challenging and take time to implement. Although the current administration focuses a progressive foreign policy towards Africa, the USG is challenged to synchronize efforts between the Departments of State, Defense and USAID. Several reasons contribute to these challenges. DOD and USAID manpower, reallocation of resources, “stove-piped” processes, and organizational culture all contribute to the difficulties that the USG has in working jointly and promoting a whole-of-government approach.

According to a senior analyst at the National Security Agency, although U.S. efforts to promote stability and security in SSA show progress, they are overly reliant on the military and do little to alleviate the perception of continued militarization of U.S. foreign policy.⁴⁴ This concerns many African leaders. U.S. AFRICOM’s nontraditional emphasis on development and threat prevention in lieu of warfighting is garnering widespread praise.⁴⁵ This new emphasis comes with challenges. Some elements within DOS and USAID express concern that DOD may overestimate its capabilities. The reality on the ground in SSA justifies this concern. The Department of State has limited

⁴⁴ Dennis J. Penn, “U.S. AFRICOM: The Militarization of U.S. Foreign policy?” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 51, (4th Quarter 2008): 74.

⁴⁵ Penn, “U.S. AFRICOM: The Militarization of U.S. Foreign policy?” 76.

foreign service workers in SSA and pales in comparison to the number of DOD personnel focused on theater security cooperation efforts.⁴⁶

This chapter provided context to the objectives and missions of the organizations responsible for executing U.S. policy in Africa to include security. The next chapter builds upon this information to examine a ‘way-ahead’.

⁴⁶Clarence J. Bouchat, “An Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional Security,” *Strategic Studies Institute* (August 2007): 6.

CHAPTER 5

CONSIDERATIONS FOR A ‘WAY-AHEAD’

Introduction

As the Department of Defense (DOD), through U.S. AFRICOM and the Department of State (DOS), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Bureau for African Affairs takes a more active role in SSA and address the security and development issues that affect the United States, there is a demonstrated need for strategic thinking to focus the efforts of the military and other governmental agencies.¹ A joint strategy for security and development in SSA would synchronize missions, manage resources, and define the linkage between security and development *ends, ways* and *means* as a path to a productivity and prosperity in the region.

Referenced throughout this chapter is the U.S. foreign policy for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Additionally, referenced are the National Security and Defense strategies, Department of State (DOS) strategic objectives to include those of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Bureau of African Affairs, and Department of Defense (DOD) strategic objectives to include those of U.S. AFRICOM.

Joint Strategy

To develop a synergy between the efforts of Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) in SSA, the United States Government (USG) should develop a joint security and development strategy. While security is a condition of U.S. military

¹ Senate Subcommittee of Foreign Relations, *Hearing on Strengthening Diplomacy to Anticipate, Prevent and Respond to Conflict in Africa*, 110th Cong., April 21, 2009.¹⁰

policy, development assistance is a crucial tool of U.S. foreign policy.² Neither development nor security works by itself. Expanding on the framework of *ends-ways-means* as it relates to strategic development, development is the *means* by which our government fights poverty, supports good governance, and promotes human welfare in developing countries around the world.³ Security is the *means* of which the government, military and, more importantly, the host country establishes a secure environment to enable development to occur. A joint security and development strategy, derived from the current National Defense Strategy and Department of State Strategy would formally provide guidance to the primary stakeholders with emphasis on U.S. AFRICOM, USAID and the Bureau of African Affairs.

Policy

U.S. AFRICOM supports the U.S. Department of State in achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives in Africa. In addition, and where appropriate, U.S. AFRICOM provides personnel and logistical support to State Department funded activities.⁴ This level of support is more through protocol and coordination by the Deputy Commander for Civil-Military Activities rather than governed through formal policy. Additionally, U.S. AFRICOM leadership recognizes that stability and security is more than just military

² Secretary of State, *U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development Strategic Plan for FY 2007 to FY 2012*, (Washington, DC, 2006): 10-11.

³ For more on strategy development. See Dr. Harry Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy*. February 2006. The word "strategy" is used as a general term for a plan, a concept, a course of action, or a "vision" of the direction in which to proceed at the personal, organizational, and governmental—local, state, or federal—levels. For more on strategic development concepts, see *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy*. Strategic Studies Institute, February 2006, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=641>.

⁴ U.S. AFRICOM Fact Sheet, September 9, 2009, <http://www.africom.mil>, (accessed December 22, 2009).

elements at work. It also recognizes elements of development are the purview of USAID and an important part of long-term stability.⁵ Joint efforts between U.S. AFRICOM and DOS are critical to furthering development and security efforts. In fact, command guidance for AFRICOM states that humanitarian and civic assistance should complement, not duplicate other USG activities. Furthermore, AFRICOM policy requires that its activities meet U.S. foreign policy objectives.⁶ U.S. AFRICOM's strategic objectives, reviewed previously, are rooted in security and development, while focusing on cooperation and partnership with African leaders. These objectives nest to and support those of DOS and DOD.

A joint security and development strategy would serve as a catalyst for a policy that outlines how, operationally, U.S. AFRICOM's efforts will be accountable to civilian policymakers, and how the interagency process will actually operate within U.S. AFRICOM. Additionally, such a strategy would systematically enlarge the output and sustainability of existing programs. Programs such as health awareness and maritime programs would all benefit from a joint strategy. DOD, through the efforts of U.S. AFRICOM, could establish targets for security to set conditions for development efforts from USAID.

Budget

A joint strategy would help manage and focus various budgets across DOS and DOD. The United States remains committed to doubling assistance to SSA to an

⁵ *Role of U.S. Africa Command in supporting African militaries*, National Public Radio, June 24, 2009.

⁶ Ploch, "Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa," 5.

estimated \$8.7 billion.⁷ This increase supports the important message that “Africa matters,” as endorsed by President Obama in a visit there in July 2009.⁸ The estimated total U.S. foreign assistance to Africa for FY 2009 was \$6.6 billion with more than half of the funding committed to health-related programs. The current administration requested more than \$6.7 billion for FY 2010. The budget request shows an increase in development assistance and economic support programs⁹. The FY 2010 budget proposal focuses on interventions critical to achieving sustainable progress and transformation in key SSA countries and balances against current investments to fight HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other health threats. The single largest expenditure in Africa, currently \$3.1 billion, is for assistance to stop the spread of HIV/AIDS. This amount represents more than half of all U.S. funding for African programs, which total \$5.3 billion. Other top programs involve development assistance (\$651 million), economic support (\$461 million) and political and judicial reforms (\$272 million).¹⁰ This request also calls for significant increases in funding for democracy, governance and education to help those countries that are close to maturing beyond weak statehood. These resources complement the major U.S. investments in Millennium Challenge Corporation programs to ensure that

⁷ U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, FY 2010*, 17. http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2010/2010_CBJ_Book_1.pdf Congressional Budget Justification (accessed December 22, 2009), 17.

⁸ President Obama visited Africa in July 11, 2009. Citation taken from his remarks in Ghana on July 11, 2009. <http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2009/July/20090711110050abretnuh0.1079783.html> (accessed December 22, 2009).

⁹ Ted Dagne, “Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues,” *Congressional Research Service, Report RL33591*, 2. (November 24, 2009): i.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs Fact Sheet, 1. http://www.allgov.com/agency/Bureau_of_African_Affairs. (accessed December 26, 2009).

collective U.S. efforts lead to balanced and sustained long-term development progress throughout SSA.¹¹

A review of the DOD and DOS budget lines demonstrates the need for joint strategy to help manage and focus funds. The annual budget for the Bureau of African Affairs was \$321.8 million for FY 2009. Given that almost half of the world's top twenty failed states are in SSA according to the 2009 Failed States Index, this amount is not robust enough to enable significant growth.¹² According to a 2010 Department of State financial review, approximately \$7.8 billion is needed in 2011 to meet all development and security goals in Africa.¹³ In comparison, U.S. AFRICOM received \$310 million for Fiscal Year 2009, and the administration requested \$278 million for Fiscal Year 2010.¹⁴ Additionally, U.S. AFRICOM receives funds to assist in training select military and civilian personnel through the International Military Education and Training (IMET), which specifically targets current and future military and civilian leadership in African nations.¹⁵ Sustained support for a robust IMET program directly supports long-term U.S. interests, is critical for building relationships with African nations and critical to

¹¹ Ted Dagne, "Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues," *Congressional Research Service, Report RL33591*, 2. (November 24, 2009):1

¹² A failed state is characterized by a loss of control of its territory or loss of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, or the lack of ability to make collective decisions, or the capacity to deliver public services. For more, The Fund for Peace Failed State Index 2009.
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=58&Itemid=87

¹³ Marian L. Lawson, "State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2011 Budget and Appropriations," *Congressional Research Service, Report RL41228*, (May 5, 2010):13.

¹⁴ U.S. AFRICOM Fact Sheet, September 9, 2009. <http://www.us.africom.mil>, (accessed December 22, 2009)

¹⁵ U.S. Africa Command Fact Sheet. *International Military Education and Training*, <http://www.africom.mil>, (accessed December 22, 2009).

improving security apparatuses that directly affect U.S. sponsored development activities, and programs.¹⁶ Projected IMET funds for FY 2010 exceed \$18 million for programs in 49 African countries. Coincidentally, the U.S. Department of State funds the IMET program.

The funding disparity between DOD and DOS is a point of friction. The difference in U.S. funding for the Bureau of African Affairs and U.S. AFRICOM in 2009 was only approximately \$20 million. This makes it difficult for DOS to establish and maintain a lead on stability and reconstruction, and leaves little funding for unseen crises and expanded support. In short, DOS needs more money to improve its ability to build capacity in the region. Given the fiscal environment, it is not likely that DOS will receive more money; therefore, reapportioning money between DOD and DOS or adjusting budgets during the next and future budget reviews may hold the answer. The current Secretary of Defense emphasized this point during a lecture series when he addressed the importance of integrating USG capabilities to include those in the private sector, universities, and in other non-governmental organizations. He said, "...for these efforts to succeed, there is a desperate need for better funding for the programs that support them." Furthermore, he noted that, "funding for non-military foreign affairs programs has increased since 2001, but remains disproportionately small relative to what we (USG) spend on the military and to the importance of such capabilities." Lastly, he noted that, "a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security:

¹⁶ U.S. Africa Command Fact Sheet. *International Military Education and Training*, <http://www.africom.mil>. (accessed December 22, 2009).

diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action and economic reconstruction and development is needed.”¹⁷

These comments did not go un-noticed. Departments of State and Defense are working to close the gap. Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) allows for reallocation of funds between DOD and DOS. The section provides authority for the DOD to transfer up to \$100 million per fiscal year in services, training, support for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries. Under Section 1207, DOD transferred to the State Department \$94.8 million in FY 2009.¹⁸ This is a good start, but not a substitute for a joint strategy supported by matching and viable funding and policy. As Department of State money funds most of the core U.S. security assistance programs for SSA, such as the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) peacekeeping training efforts, the Bureau of African Affairs and U.S. AFRICOM should consider merging contractor efforts to enhance contractor support across the region.¹⁹

¹⁷ Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates (lecture Series at Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS., November 26, 2007).

¹⁸ Nina M. Serafino, “ Department of Defense “Section 1207” Security and Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional Concerns”. *Congressional Research Service*. (June 23, 2009), 3, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22871.pdf>. (accessed December 26, 2009).

¹⁹ The Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program is a Department of State (DOS) funded and managed initiative designed to improve African militaries’ capabilities by providing selected training and equipment required to execute multinational peace support operations.

Manning and Collaboration

Currently, DOD, through U.S. AFRICOM coordinates with DOS to synchronize capacity-building efforts.²⁰ The Deputy to the Commander for Civil Military Activities is a promising appointment to put the Department of State in the lead for foreign security assistance. A joint strategy could include a multi-year plan for strengthening U.S. civilian policy and program capacities in SSA. This strategy would emphasize the exceptional needs in these areas. Of note, funding for foreign security assistance comes through Title 22 funds provided to DOS, not DOD.²¹ A suggestion is for U.S. AFRICOM to consider apportioning personnel to Department of State to assist with foreign assistance programs. This would serve two purposes. It would, alleviate some of the manpower shortages in DOS and secondly, ensure U.S. AFRICOM interests and capabilities are properly represented. Collaboration between the Bureau of African Affairs and U.S. AFRICOM is important to leverage the efforts of each organization. The Assistant Secretary for African Affairs should reiterate his bureau's support for AFRICOM's mission and instruct U.S. embassies in sub-Saharan Africa on how to work with AFRICOM's requests for support.²²

U.S. AFRICOM fully recognizes that success hinges on working with the interagency. As such, it has taken steps to involve stakeholders by inviting interagency representatives to visit the command to see firsthand the need to have their personnel serving in AFRICOM. This process, however, does not guarantee that other agencies

²⁰ U.S. AFRICOM Fact Sheet, September 9, 2009. <http://www.africom.mil>. (accessed December 29, 2009).

²¹ Ibid.

²² U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, *Inspection of the Bureau of African Affairs* (Washington DC, August 2009),3.

will commit to filling interagency positions. Beyond to seeking interagency participation at its headquarters, U.S. AFRICOM is also adjusting its planning to involve other agencies and better align its plans and activities with those agencies.²³ Neither U.S. AFRICOM nor the interagency ignore the fact that each has different cultures; but nevertheless, this difference should not be a hindrance to mission accomplishment. Without interagency collaboration and a synchronized effort with its U.S. government partners, U.S. AFRICOM may not be able to achieve the level of effectiveness it expects, resulting in a whole-of-government approach that does not work. To facilitate interagency collaboration, U.S. AFRICOM initially focused on integrating personnel from other USG agencies into the command, which according to DOD and U.S. AFRICOM officials, is essential.²⁴ By bringing knowledge of their home agencies into the command, personnel from other federal agencies, such as USAID, expect to improve the planning and execution of AFRICOM's plans, programs, and activities and to stimulate collaboration among U.S. government agencies. Unlike liaisons in other combatant commands, U.S. AFRICOM is integrating personnel from other federal agencies into leadership, management, and staff positions throughout the command structure.²⁵ Getting consensus is especially critical in an interagency context because DOD cannot compel civilian agencies to assign personnel to fill interagency positions in a DOD command. Initially, this may seem to be insufficient but it forces a culture and

²³ U.S. AFRICOM Fact Sheet, September 9, 2009, <http://www.africom.mil>, (accessed December 29, 2009).

²⁴ U.S. Government Accountability Office, Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa Command, GAO, (Washington DC, 2009)

²⁵ U.S. AFRICOM also has several non-DOD personnel in non-reimbursable liaison positions, such as the Foreign Policy Advisor and the Humanitarian Assistance Advisor.

focus change that is a steps in the right direction. Since policy drives strategy and strategy establishes benchmarks or objectives for operations, organizational structure is one area where a joint strategy would match requirements to objectives.

Summary

A joint strategy for security and development in SSA would enhance the outputs of DOD, DOS and USAID and help the USG achieve its goals. The actions of the Department of Defense, through U.S. AFRICOM, coupled with the programs conducted by the Department of State and United States Agency for International Development improve SSA's chances of developing stronger governance, eradicating crime and corruption and reducing the spread of infectious diseases.

Despite not having a current joint strategy, there is an example of 'jointness' demonstrated between U.S. AFRICOM and USAID in Liberia that demonstrates the value of a joint strategy. The United States has a long history with Liberia as previously addressed. Following over a decade of corruption, conflict and poor governance, Liberia, under the leadership of a new president, seeks to develop itself into an enduring country that provides for its citizens, is a positive member of the African community and fits into the global market. U.S. AFRICOM's military-to-military training with Liberian military forces have helped increase security in Liberia. With this improved post-conflict stability, DOS and USAID, supported by U.S. AFRICOM, are helping Liberia make considerable strides in strengthening governance, combat corruption, build capacity and deliver basic services.²⁶

²⁶ Katherine Almquist, "U.S. Africa Command's Contributions to USAID Mission," (Stuttgart, Germany, October 17, 2008), U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs.

Obstacles for a joint strategy do exist. To list a few, U.S. AFRICOM is challenged to change the perception of what many Africans fear; that, AFRICOM only ‘militarizes’ development on the continent. Additionally, the Bureau of African Affairs is under- funded and undermanned. Lastly, there is no official mandate to integrate civilian agencies with DOD although U.S. AFRICOM works diligently to close the gap. A joint strategy would help Ambassadors shape regional programs synchronized with military operations. A study by the National Defense University suggested that in particular where the U.S. military is engaged, the State Department can arrange for an Ambassador to coordinate with his/her neighboring colleagues to manage funds and share programs that support operations.²⁷ To enforce the published commitment of the United States to sub-Saharan Africa, the USG must take serious and sustainable steps to achieve U.S. policy. A joint strategy for security and development would be a step in the right direction.

²⁷ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Strengthening U.S. Diplomacy to Anticipate, Prevent And Respond to Conflict in Africa*, 110th Cong., 2d sess., April 21, 2009, S. Rep, 8.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Only through security and development can there be stability, and only through stability can there be hope for the future.¹

This thesis concludes that a joint strategy for security and development between the Departments of State and Defense will enhance the United States' ability to achieve its foreign interests in sub-Saharan Africa. The thesis examined the important nexus between security and development in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to establish that a joint strategy for security and development rather than separate approaches by the Departments of State and Defense will better serve U.S. foreign interest. The thesis reviewed the history and environment, examined challenges facing the U.S. Government and then reviewed U.S. policy, both Departments of State and Defense strategic objectives and the objectives of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The research highlighted the challenges and threats emanating from weak or failing states and linked those challenges to the above-mentioned strategic objectives.² Furthermore, this thesis examined causes and other issues that contribute to the challenges facing the U.S. Government. For example, corruption and weak security apparatuses in Somalia, conditions that U.S. AFRICOM works to eliminate, make development efforts by the Department of State

¹U.S. Africa Command, *Commander's Intent 2010*, General Kip Ward, (Stuttgart, Germany, January 2010).

²White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, (Washington, DC: White House, 2006).

difficult.³ This example, one of many, portrays the important balance, or nexus, between security and development.

This thesis does not argue that the Departments of State and Defense do not work to assist SSA in combating challenges such as health problems and weak security apparatuses, but it does propose that a joint strategy focused on security and development would create efficiencies, minimize risks and close the gap between military and interagency cultures. The result would be attainment of U.S. goals and objectives, and a region with more states capable of providing basic services to their people and better able to compete in domestic and global markets. It is important for the USG to develop a joint interagency strategy for security and development in SSA to establish a foundation for successful execution of U.S. foreign policy. Ms. Theresa Whelan, former Pentagon Africa Policy Chief acknowledged that the nexus between security and development is important, and that this nexus postures the U.S. to have the political access necessary to achieve U.S. foreign interests. Furthermore, she added that DOD, primarily through U.S. AFRICOM, must work with other elements of the USG and interagency to promote security, governance, rule of law, and social and economic development.⁴ It is fair to say that previously addressed issues such as funding disparities, staffing, authorities and organizational cultures will continue to challenge the Departments of State and Defense. These issues are surmountable and should not overshadow the necessity to establish a unified outcome or end state, one that is possible through a joint strategy executed by the interagency organizations .

³U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Humanitarian Aid to Somalia*, (Washington, DC: May 19, 2008).

⁴Theresa Whelan, “U.S. Objectives for Africa Command,” (lecture, London, UK, February 18, 2008).

Sub-Saharan Africa faces persistent challenges ranging from conflict and corruption to shortages and poor management of natural resources. At the same time, the region faces new opportunities, which through the collective security and development efforts of DOD and DOS, can lead to a prosperous and productive future. Research from a recent Congressional Research Service study shows that the number of conflicts in the SSA has declined over the last 5-10 years, but instability in many countries continues to threaten overall regional security and impede development efforts by both U.S. and African organizations.⁵ Future U.S. efforts will likely center on maintaining peace and security in the region, including U.S. support for peacekeeping training which is an important subset of the U.S. AFRICOM mission. Additionally, U.S. efforts will focus on development assistance to include promoting good governance, rule of law and human rights.⁶ According to an assessment by the National Intelligence Center, over the next decade, SSA will grow to be a supplier of basic commodities, but not experience any substantial economic growth that enables it to support the local population. In fact, SSA will remain vulnerable to strains on the population, economy and natural resources for the next 15-20 years and far beyond. This will result in increased corruption, regional insecurity, and other challenges such as failed governments, and military oppression.⁷ The USG should expect a ‘domino effect’ of negative behavior across the region. These areas of vulnerability provide focus for a joint security and development strategy that guides the efforts of the Departments of State and Defense.

⁵ Lauren Ploch, “Issue Statement on Sub-Saharan Africa”, *Congressional Research Service*, (January 11, 2010):1

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ National Intelligence Center 2008-03. “*Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World.*” <http://www.dni.gov/NIC-2025-project.html.vii>, (accessed October 25, 2009).

Research shows that security enables development. A recent study by the Brookings Institute of U.S. policy applied against select regions in Africa concluded that there is an increasingly growing connection between execution of U.S. policy, development programs and security reform.⁸ For example, as addressed earlier, DOD contributions (through U.S. AFRICOM) to post-conflict stability in Liberia enabled USAID to work with the Liberian government to build governance, end corruption and establish strong institutions. Sub-Saharan Africa is on a positive course to reducing conflict, building democratic institutions and promoting sustainable livelihoods for its people; and the commitment of the current administration helps SSA move along this course.⁹ DOD and DOS will continue to assess the progress in SSA through country-team actions, training and leader engagements. Both DOS and DOD have clearly established strategic objectives for SSA exercised through the Bureau for African Affairs and U.S. AFRICOM respectively. Neither can execute U.S. foreign policy by itself. The Department of Defense provides substantial support to the U.S. foreign policy objective of providing security assistance programs. With this, it is important to understand the term *support*. As stated in the 2008 National Defense Strategy, promoting security is a primary objective for DOD; however, DOD does not decide which countries should receive security assistance. This is responsibility of the DOS.¹⁰ Moreover, DOD does not decide which development programs to utilize within a country. Again, this is the responsibility of DOS with advisory support from Ambassadors and their country

⁸ Abigail Jones, "U.S. Foreign Assistant to Sub-Saharan Africa: A snapshot of previous U.S. priorities and recommendations for the Obama Administration." *Global Economy and Development*, no. 9 (November 2008): 1.

⁹ United States Africa Command 2009 Posture Statement, (March 2009): 1.

¹⁰ Secretary of Defense, "The National Defense Strategy," (June 2008): 1.

teams.¹¹ For the remaining three U.S. policy objectives: promoting democracy, economic growth, and health and social development, DOD does not have the personnel, expertise or the intent to "lead" in these roles.¹² The primary responsibility for achieving these objectives rests within DOS and other U.S. government agencies. DOD provides critical support to them when and where requested. A joint strategy might refine responsibility for these important actions.

Drawing on the policy objectives of providing security, health and social development referenced above and reflected in both the DOS and DOD strategic objectives, recent activities in the West African country of Senegal provide a good example of the nexus between security and development. After more than two decades of conflict, security improvements in Senegal enabled USAID to advance peace building, conflict resolution, and educational activities. These security improvements are largely due to the military-to-military engagements between U.S. AFRICOM and Senegalese militaries as commented by the Chief of Defense Staff, Senegalese Armed Forces during a visit with the U.S. AFRICOM leadership on February 11, 2010. The Chief of Defense said, "he appreciated the efforts of U.S. Africa Command in enhancing African capabilities and capacities to better face security challenges, enhancing the capacities of their militaries and their efforts to manage security issues."¹³ Such engagement by U.S. AFRICOM established secure conditions for USAID and other U.S. organizations to

¹¹ Country team is used generically to represent the U.S. Ambassador and his or her assigned personnel in a given country.

¹² Phillip Carter, III, "U.S. Policy in Africa in the 21st Century," *The Africa Center for Strategic Studies*, (February 14, 2009.): 3.

¹³ U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs. "Senegalese Chief of Defense Visit." <http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=4017&lang=0>, (accessed February 11, 2010).

promote developmental programs in Senegal.¹⁴ These actions provide a good model for other countries in the region and show a positive result of joint efforts between the two departments.

Recommendation

The following provides a recommendation for the Departments of State and Defense to develop a joint strategy for security and development through the context of ends, ways and means as well as review of objectives, staffing and budgeting. Additionally, below are examples of joint development and security efforts from DOS and DOD respectively. Within the context of strategic development, U.S. foreign policy for Africa, coupled with articulated national interests, serves as the *end(s)*, which supports DOS and DOD Defense strategic objectives or the *way(s)*, which in turn guides or directs the activities or the *mean(s)* of USAID, the Bureau of African Affairs and U.S. AFRICOM respectively. Developing a joint strategy comes with challenges, the biggest of which is balancing ends, ways and means as a path to operationalize existing guidance found in National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 50. In sum, this directive outlines the U.S. security strategy for sub-Saharan Africa, which includes the objectives of building capacity, bolstering fragile states, strengthening regional security and providing development and humanitarian assistance. This directive also provides parameters for both DOD and DOS for execution of their respective strategic objectives. Although NSPD 50 provides a good foundation for implementing U.S. policy in SSA, it does not offer a joint strategy specifically focused on security and development, which

¹⁴ USAID executes various development programs in Senegal and other West African countries. For more on USAID activities in Senegal, see USAID in Sub-Saharan Africa website found at http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/countries/senegal/.

the above research shows are critical elements to advancing U.S. foreign policy interests in the region.¹⁵

If the USG is serious about successfully implementing its Africa policy, it may have to take non-traditional measures to overcome the barriers addressed earlier and maximize the efforts of DOS and DOD. Moreover, such measures may posture the U.S. as a key partner for SSA, both politically and economically. This effort could begin with a Congressional review of U.S. foreign policy for Africa through the context of a three key questions. First, what fundamental national interests does the United States have in SSA? Next, what strategic objectives best support those interests? Lastly, is coordination between the DOS and DOD on security assistance and military efforts sufficient?¹⁶ Answers to these questions will define a linkage between ends, ways and means and determine that a rebalance of priorities for security, development and humanitarian assistance is necessary.

Another ‘non-traditional’ measure could be to appoint a senior Department of State representative responsible for all security and development activities in the region. This does not need to be a newly appointed position. For example, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs could fulfill this duty. An initial and primary responsibility could be a review of the DOS and DOD strategic objectives for Africa that address capacity building and security reform. Such a review would focus on consolidating efforts, eliminating redundancies and focusing limited and competing

¹⁵ President, Directive, “U.S. National Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa,” *NSPD 50*, (2007).

¹⁶ Lauren Ploch, “Issue Statement on Sub-Saharan Africa,” *Congressional Research Service*, (January 11, 2010): 3.

resources. This would help determine which of those objectives are most important and achievable. Following, a review of staffing within DOS and DOD could identify organizational shortfalls and propose options to fill those shortfalls. For example, as addressed in a previous chapter, DOD, through U.S. AFRICOM, could apportion personnel to DOS to offer assistance and expertise where needed. The same exchange could occur from DOS to DOD. This would serve two key purposes. The first of which would be to help break down the cultural barriers that impede collaboration and cooperation and the second would be to share expertise with respect to key aspects of development and security assistance.

A challenging, but important endeavor would be the management of funds. This would be a complicated and time-consuming process best executed through established budgeting cycles and linked to the Quadrennial Defense Review. Another option, although not as enduring, would be to redirect DOD funds to DOS through Section 1207 authority to support stability and reconstruction projects.

Through the collective efforts of representatives from the DOS and DOD that champion regional issues in SSA, it is feasible to focus objectives on priority regions or countries within SSA. In essence, these regions could serve as a ‘beacons of light’ that complement U.S. interests and demonstrate the potential to spread prosperity. For example, the region of West Africa shows promise with enduring productive countries such as Ghana and Senegal. Focusing joint security and development efforts in this region would not only promote similar growth into bordering countries, but also minimize coordination required between Ambassadors, country teams, interagency and DOD and involve important African organizations such as the African Union. Joint

development efforts would allow the Department of State to assume a lead role in development issues with Department of Defense in support. In the short term, a joint development approach would support the goals of both DOS and DOD and in the long term, decrease those negative characteristics associated with weak and failed states like corruption, illegal trafficking and unemployment.

There are existing programs that the USG may leverage to support a joint strategy. For example, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program supports the U.S. National Security Strategy objective of strengthening regional security by allowing foreign military officers to attend U.S. military schools and training. The Department of Justice supports this same objective by providing training programs for regional police forces. Efforts such as these have improved security in many countries within SSA; however, there remains much more to do to make the region stable. Furthermore, continued efforts from the DOS and USAID may boost the economic base, a major challenge in SSA, but a condition that is necessary to advance U.S. interests. Congress has taken a step in the right direction, by adopting the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2000 and later extending it to 2015.¹⁷ This movement alone stimulated two-way trade between the U.S. and the thirty-eight AGOA nations.¹⁸ It is important to note that such economic development is not divorced from security reform. In fact, free trade can be a potent weapon against terror directed against the United States. Economic stability, promoted by job growth, helps create an

¹⁷ Marian L. Tupy. "U.S. Policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa," *CATO Handbook on U.S. Policy*, (December 2004): 3.

¹⁸ The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was signed into law on May 18, 2000 as Title 1 of The Trade and Development Act of 2000. The Act offers tangible incentives for African countries to continue their efforts to open their economies and build free markets.

environment that repels rather than attract potential terrorist sympathizers. In the past eight years, U.S. trade with SSA has more than doubled as Africans improve their lives and livelihoods while exporting an ever-expanding list of goods to the United States, says Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Demetrios Marantis.¹⁹ This statement shows the need for continued focus from the Departments of State and Defense to advance economic development and security reform. To demonstrate this commitment, USAID has established four regional trade hubs in SSA to promote trade and economic growth. In support of this important effort, DOD, through U.S. AFRICOM, has increased partnership with numerous African militaries and now works more closely with African leadership to decrease instability and increase development. Recently, in a 2010 commander's intent letter, the Commander of U.S. AFRICOM highlighted the command's strides in helping its African partners develop security capacity. General Ward also highlighted partnership exercises that have enhanced interoperability. Also highlighted, was the importance of working with interagency partners. He said, "the planning required for our activities involves several government entities and our own military...it is vital that we engage continuously."²⁰

In sum, a joint strategy for security and development benefits both the U.S. and SSA. Such a strategy would serve to advance U.S. interests, increase political access and more importantly, posture SSA to help itself. In an era of persistent conflict and two on-


¹⁹ Merle D. Kellerhalis, "U.S.-Africa Trade More Than Doubles in Eight years," *America.Gov*, February 17, 2010, <http://www.america.gov/st/business-english/2010/February/201021714055/dmskahellerko.4736644.html>.

²⁰ U.S. Africa Command, *Commander's Intent 2010*, General Kip Ward, (Stuttgart, Germany, January 2010).

going wars, it is important to ‘think’ differently and modify the strategies that drive execution of U.S. policy. In order to meet the U.S. commitment to SSA and enhance achievement of U.S. foreign policy, a joint strategy for security and development would create the momentum and structure necessary to meet established goals. Both the United States and Sub-Saharan Africa make significantly greater progress by doing so.

Appendix A

Sub-Saharan Africa



SOURCE: WorldMaps.org

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Vita

Colonel Gary Brito graduated from Pennsylvania State University in December 1986 where he received a Regular Army commission as an Infantry officer. He has served in a variety of overseas and stateside operational and staff assignments. Colonel Brito has two deployments to Iraq with the first as a Brigade Operations Officer with 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and the second deployment as the battalion commander of 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division. Most recent assignments include, Chief of the Commanders Planning Group, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Executive Officer to the TRADOC Commanding General. Following graduation from JAWS, Colonel Brito will assume command of the 120th Infantry Training Support Brigade at Fort Hood, Texas. He is married to the former Michelle Harper of Washington, D.C. and they have two sons, Matthew and Patrick.